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Abstract
Play is a fundamental experience embedded within human culture. We all play in
some perceptible manner that provides our lives with meaning we don’t ordinarily
feel from other pursuits that are means-ended. Sport philosophers have depended
upon the seminal theories of Huizinga and Caillois to shape their constraints on the
play world. Huizinga’s and Caillois’ definition both use formal analysis to protect
the play sphere however, their theories fail in providing justifiable reason to protect
the play sphere and the meaning it has. I propose that understanding play from the
perspective of existentialism provides a better way to understand its meaning and
truly understand how it shapes the understanding of play, games, and sports with
the field of the philosophy of sport.
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Chapter 1: Towards Lusory Introspection
1.1 Introduction
At some point in the long history of humanity’s quotidian life, games and sports
were conceived forever altering our world. The creation of games and sports may
have delivered us from an exclusively functionalist outlook of humanity, thus
evolving our position towards concepts more intrinsically meaningful such as
‘play.’1 At what point games and sports were conceived, we cannot be entirely sure,
but throughout their extensive genealogy their link to the phenomenological
concept of ‘play’ appears undeniable. The occurrence of play has permeated all of
human history; no civilization has ever been free of its influence.2 Sports and games
are the most readily identifiable play forms known to our society, even carving out a
special space to be celebrated as such. The exact definitions of play, games, and
sports have been unclear. Furthermore, the relationship amongst the combined trio
can be especially difficult to grasp. Modern sports and games are celebrated, not the
least because they contain important human significance through their connection
with the play phenomenon, but they appear to be indistinguishable from one
another at times. The diverse natures and structures of games, sports, and play
must be defined to develop substantiated philosophical theories concerning the

1

The quotation marks a semantic shift from the word’s ordinary usage, indicating a
conceptual or theoretical meaning different from conventional usage.
2 Klaus Meier, “An Affair of Flutes: An Appreciation of Play,” Journal of Philosophy of
Sport, VII (1980): p. 24.
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interrelationships amongst these three concepts, in order to better identify meaning
inherent to the activities.3
Play, games, and sports are valued human concepts that are interrelated;
however, play is the constant that precedes the two social constructions of games
and sports, whose definitions, or purpose, have yet to fully crystalize. Bernard Suits
describes games and sports as “enterprises or institutions” and play, game, and
sport in combination as the “tricky triad.”4 The cumulative group name derives
from the similarities each individual concept shares with the others, creating
difficulty in precisely defining them as distinct and independent concepts, especially
games and sport. The play element complicates the triad because it can be an
integral factor to the two remaining concepts, i.e. ‘game’ and ‘sport,’ that are quite
similar. With concepts so ill-defined, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint what a
person is doing exactly, when he/she is engaged in sport or a game, and the
significance these actions can have. Are they experiencing all three elements of the
tricky triad simultaneously, or do they exist in a progressive manner where they can
be subsumed sequentially in a sort of continuum? The quest in philosophy of sport,
to gain further understanding of these relationships is predicated upon formulating
an exact philosophical definition of each component of the tricky triad. This quest
may clarify the nebulous relationship between the three concepts, but also

3

Klaus Meier, “Triad Trickery: Playing With Sport and Games,” Journal of Philosophy
of Sport, XV (1988): p. 11.
4 Bernard Suits, “Tricky Triad: Games, Play, and Sport,” Journal of Philosophy of
Sport, XV (1988): p. 1.
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determines the boundary for creating a specified scope delimiting each component
to its perceived essence.
Play is a fundamental experience embedded in human culture. We all play in
some perceptible manner or another, but often it occurs without any sort of
recognition. Most of the time, we limit our understanding of play to the world of
childish folly, often overlooking its presence in other aspects of our lives
traditionally thought to be exclusively serious. It even can also be overlooked in
sports and games of contemporary culture, with such high stakes attached to
athletic pursuit. Sports and games represent the most obvious link to simple ‘play’
forms, but with the added complexity introduced by varying degrees of human
sophistication. They present a human constructed lens for us to discover life
unfettered by our penchant towards the mundane pursuits of societal means-ended
functioning, in other words, ‘work.’ By playing these human constructions, we can
realize complete freedom from the societal circumstances that impose an attitude of
work that is highly regimented. I believe the structure of sports and games are
designed to safeguard the purity of play in a sacred place that is held distinct from
the antithetical world of means-ended pursuits. The sport philosopher, Klaus Meier
emphasizes the sanctity of play, while divorcing it from the world of means-ended
conduct.
Play is not a means to external ends or purposes; it does not further survival,
sustenance, pragmatic, or materialistic interests. It is process rather than product
oriented. The interest in play is the pursuit of internal values and ends; the reward
is in the act. Thus, the prize of play is play itself.5

5

Klaus Meier, “An Affair of Flutes: An Appreciation of Play,” Journal of Philosophy of
Sport, VII (1980): p. 25.
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Experiencing play is an intrinsic choice by the sport player done simply for
the sake of itself and no other. Nevertheless, humanity’s infatuation with sport
presents a remarkable paradox, since, in most cases, sports involve activities
arbitrarily constructed, for no apparent external purpose related to the teleological
utility of enlightened practices. Sports are prized greatly within culture because they
symbolize a source of freedom that can’t be experienced during traditional meansended activity. They require a wholly different mental attitude that one can only
carry intrinsically, separating it from the ordinary world we normally operate in.
Meier further suggests, “Any pragmatic culture so heavily oriented toward
productive, utilitarian enterprises will view the adult player as irresponsible, and
will tolerate play only with suspicion, guarded restraint, and constraints.”6 Sure
enough, the means-ended faction suspicious of play described above by Meier has
co-opted mainstream sport. The far-reaching influence of this idea of human
purpose has fundamentally perverted our collective attitudes towards ‘playing’
sport. Today, all levels of sport are largely driven by outcomes, results, and benefits.
Inevitably this has caused us to lose our way in such a meaningful and honorable
endeavor. I intend on producing a vigorous philosophical defense of play in order to
once again recognize the value of our play in the face of a fast changing landscape for
sport.

6

Klaus Meier, “An Affair of Flutes: An Appreciation of Play,” Journal of Philosophy of
Sport, VII (1980): p. 27.
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1.2 Relative Value of Play in all its Manifestations within
Society
Klaus Meier, in “An Affair of Flutes” best describes the value of play for the purposes
of this study. Humanity is traditionally governed by a means-ended approach to all
goal-oriented tasks due of our unique level of reasoning. In Western culture, the
reign of the ideology of work gives us highly limited permission to be useless.7 From
the start of humanity’s new beginning in the New World, harsh cruelties have
necessitated a means-ended outlook simply for survival. Puritan settlers conceived
the attitude described as the ‘Protestant work ethic’ that still persists today.8
Subsequent generations who subscribe to this work ethic, believe hardworking
people are destined for salvation, while the slothful will be condemned to
damnation. After all, during the beginning of European settlement of the New World
humans lived a barren existence. Now we have reshaped the world to reflect our
ingenuity and self-determination through tireless work ensuring our own destiny.
Incrementally, the global society has progressed to this point through a continuous
work mentality shaped by the Protestant work ethic. The reason for crafting the
world in this way, is that it lends to the idea that our collective existence has some
sort of greater purpose other than becoming a prisoner of one’s imprudent
indulgence in all things pro tem; otherwise what deeper meaning could humanity
experience beyond the emptiness of a fleeting thrill? Meier suggests that part of
human identity is shaped through productivity and work.
7
8

Meier, “An Affair of Flutes,” p. 25
Ibid p. 25
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The construction of a secular version of this code contributed to the
increasing acceptance of the assumption that man’s expectations and
orientation should be framed and nurtured under the category of
work and the understanding that he literally manufactures his
identity and dignity by his fabrications as a functional entity in the
work world.9
Humanity’s elevated level of reasoning, in addition to the combination of
social and self-awareness, might lead one to surmise that our purpose revolves
around the creation and advancement of a uniform social veneer used to promote
greater levels of productivity, which is best described as civilization. Within a
civilized society, various milestones mark the gradual means-ended progression of
our species within the practices of politics, architecture, literature, etc. that further
distance us from the state of nature forewarned by Hobbes. All of these pursuits
have a practical application that contributes incrementally to the edifice of
civilization in a rather noticeable way. In spite of this work attitude employed in
day-to-day contemporary civilized life, games and sports run contrary to the
principled and deliberate means-ended approach. Furthermore, Meier asserts that
play allows man to truly exist within the world devoid of the weight and
consequence of means-ended thought.
Play may be heralded as a singularly fulfilled, liberating experience,
through which man opens doors normally closed, alters his habitual
modes of perception, refuses categorically to tolerate premature and
limiting closures, views naked simplicity of the world and entities
within it, and inaugurates processes and actions of creative and
novel transformation.10
If games and sport are truly linked to whimsical play, they pose a deepseated contradiction to our purpose within a purposeful societal structure. Yet,
9

Meier, “An Affair of Flutes,” p. 26.
Ibid p.31.
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oddly, game and sport completely and utterly captivate a significant space within
the civilized socio-cultural sphere. Games and sports are dedicated to being carried
out simply for their own sake and not any other, while taking place in a world far
removed from the one in which we normally exist. Despite the fact that these
diversions don’t add any special value to ordinary civilized culture, they are
celebrated and cherished as institutions in their own right. Sport as an institution,
isn’t in keeping with the cultural treasures produced by humanity’s typical meansended approach. It is my belief that such means-ended cultural treasures are
celebrated because they embody the ideals central to that specific practice’s
functional utility while proving to be aesthetically pleasing in a way that is timeless.
However, when sport is played in a genuine manner, it possesses similar, if not
equal or greater, significance while never approaching the same tangible utility of
practices with definite consequences. Coincidentally, watching skilled athletes
participating in sport is aesthetically pleasing, and it is no wonder that we have
come to find value in it as spectacle first and foremost. Playing sport is one of the
greatest paradoxes inherent to our culture when juxtaposed with work mentality as
outlined by Meier in “The Affair of Flutes,” which I also support. I seek to probe
further into Meier’s accurate assessment of play and work. Play and work have
existed since the point of humanity’s beginning, but their recent intersection within
newly-treasured contrived play activities such as sports, and games presents an
especially peculiar morass, which obscures the timeless meaning inherent to such a
simple pursuit.

8

1.3 The Play Paradox
For most theories on play, in particular, those utilized in this study by Huizinga,
Caillois, Suits, and Meier, it quickly becomes apparent that games and sports don’t
really matter in terms of actual consequence because they are dedicated to a world
apart. Relative to the means-ended approach that promotes calculated and
considered decisions in support of the ordinary attitude, sustained play cannot exist
without freedom from oppressive real world conditions. Sustained play could be
describe as informal or formal but extending beyond a fleeting moment. Therefore,
a clear distinction forms between humanity’s practical focus and the superfluous
nature of play. Nonetheless, spirited competition is the characteristic most common
to the participants in games and sports, essentially conducting themselves as if it
were the only matter of any importance within the span of that moment. For some,
sports do matter, and such intense focus on the frivolous appears to some others, to
be a gross misunderstanding of one’s priorities. This phenomena is not unique to
frolicking youth unconcerned with the burden of responsibility, but is shared by the
non-varsity college student, the weekend bowler, the middle-aged person training
simply to attempt to complete a marathon, and even the senior citizen playing
checkers. Sports and games are a significant aspect of the lives of all sorts of people,
because we love to revel in the play phenomenon. All of the activities above share
similar characteristics but certainly are not identical. These opportunities are
normally considered pursuits that provide peoples’ lives with significant meaning.
Following the player’s participation a peculiar feeling of fulfillment engulfs them;
however, such feelings of fulfillment typically require accomplishment. Each contest

9
has a winner and a loser. Most participants don’t win the tournaments they are
involved in. They could be viewed as having squandered precious time they could
have used to go about the business of accomplishing more practical endeavors
instrumental to humanity’s continued means-ended progression. Despite the
discord between the deep meaningfulness of a player’s participation and the
activity’s purposelessness, the meaning of the moment persists long after its end,
enduring within the player. Sports can’t be evaluated using the same cost-benefit
criteria traditionally used to determine material value in our lives, the existential
meaning of game-play experienced by the true player is just too great. Ultimately,
the irony of the true player signifies a paradox bordering upon the absurd.
For the overwhelming minority, their participation in sport begets external
value when classified as a professional. They retain the single tangible link
connecting games and sport to the ordinary means-ended functioning world. The
majority of people engage in games and sports without receiving extrinsic rewards
as a result of their efforts. With this being the case, from a logical perspective, our
behavior in activities so absurd is quite curious, especially upon considering that
our human faculties are guided by purposive action. Why engage in sport if you are
not guaranteed to be compensated like you ordinarily would for achieving other
goal-oriented activity? Are playing games and sports for their own sake simply a
waste of time? It all seems illogical and confounding when considering our
normative means-ended outlook. Therefore, such questions warrant closer scrutiny
of the lasting existential meaning the player experiences while at play. This poses a
fundamental contrast with the underlying structural difference of contemporary

10
elite/professional sports. These pursuits seemingly forsake the play mentality in
sports, modifying it to a novel work approach. It is my assertion that when
contemporary sport follows this paradigm it creates an unintended moral morass
due to the player’s attitudinal perversion. Within the structure of contemporary
hyper-competitive sport, it ceases to retain any sort of personal meaning when
conducted ad libitum. Contemporary sport is no longer self-fulfilling from a
standpoint of choosing sport as mechanism to find meaning or purpose in one’s life.
The attitude of work, and means-ended calculation, has infiltrated contemporary
sport imposing an external purpose that our society believes is inherent to
humanity, into something that has no greater purpose beyond itself.
This critical review can make one question and reflect back to the countless
blocks of time spent playing these seemingly foolish games we have constructed.
Have we wasted the better part of our youth by not working? In retrospect my
participation in sports seems illogical when I consider the alternate opportunities
along other paths I declined to explore. Nevertheless, I can’t deny the meaningful
memories had memories when I scored my first touchdown, or every time I
experience a satisfying exchange of a well-played tennis rally, or when I dunked the
basketball for the first time during the course of a game.11 Equally important, are
the lasting memories of lessons learned following bitter failure. With each memory
my heart swells with pride, overriding the logical faculties that tell me what I’m
doing isn’t that important in the grand scheme of things. The meaningfulness
experienced by the player speaks to the existential component of games and sport
11

As a caveat, part of this essay will be through an interpretation of the author’s
own experience ‘playing.’

11
that connect us all. As Albert Camus perfectly encapsulated sport’s
universalizability, “After many years during which I saw many things, what I know
most surely about morality and the duty of man I owe to sport.”12

1.4 Meaning through the Existential View
Some forms of existential absurdum suggest we live in a purposeless, chaotic
universe, which is inherently meaningless.13 According to the existential philosophy
of Albert Camus, the absurd dictates that no meaning can be found in the world
beyond the individual meaning we provide it. For meaning to come to pass, the
existential philosophy of Sartre states that a human agent’s, “existence precedes
essence.”14 Sartre’s maxim diverges from the ancient Greek philosophy of Aristotle
who believed a thing’s essence translated to its intended purpose. It has been from
Aristotle’s function argument where our Western attitudes about humanity and
purpose were originally formed.15 Sartre’s famous assertion is essentially proposing
that human beings begin from a point similar to John Locke’s16 concept of tabula

12

Brian Cronin, “Stupid, Absurd Sports,” The Harvard Crimson. (2012, April 19th).
Retrieved from http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2012/4/19/harvard-sportsare-stupid/
13 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Albert Camus,” Last Updated (2011, Oct
27th). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/camus/
14 Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. (New York: Meridian
Books, 1956), p. 289.
15 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. William David Ross (Oxford: University
Press, 2009) p. 10
16 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (Toronto: Penguin
Books Ltd, 1997)
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rasa.17 This leads to the suggestion that humanity simply exists prior to any
concepts of values or ethics. Therefore the position is that humanity can’t have
altruistic values or universal ethics that are not acquired or developed e.g. (The Lord
of the Flies.)18 With no accepted criteria of what constitutes a human being’s
essence, no definition exists as to what it means to be human. It is then incumbent
upon every individual to fulfill their existence by choosing their own meaningful
essence. Accordingly, a human being realizes their essence by the conscious choices
they make in order to shape concepts like values and ethics. On this account, it is
solely through the process of living that one defines one's self. However, exclusively
dedicating oneself to becoming the greatest ball-player misses the point of ‘playing.’
Play should be considered an excellent compliment, but shaping the entirety of one’s
essence around game seems to be a gross misunderstanding of the concept’s trivial
nature. The aforementioned meaning experienced by the player derives from the
freedom to determine their essence by the means of their most basic form of
existence in the form of their own body. To apply this concept to play, the meaning
felt by the player revolves around choice and freedom, concepts epitomizing the
idea of existence. To use one’s body and mind only in a way to seek some further
instrumental good, is in itself a choice of how to live life. Further, on this account,
the genuine player’s choice is superior to the instrumental participant because the
choice is made for a good determined by one’s self and not by, or for, any external
factor.

17

Latin phrase, which translates to, scraped tablet, which implies blank slate
especially when referring to birth or infancy.
18 William Golding, The Lord of the Flies. (Great Britain: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1954)

13
In other words, the game-player’s play possesses self-defining meaning that
is not conditional to the player’s surroundings, but exists unconditionally in their
heart. If we are to accept this as being true, then it becomes crucial to examine the
constitution of sports, games, and play to understand what we are truly doing.

1.5 Importance of ‘Playing’ Sport
In order to truly pinpoint the essence of sports and games, the appropriate point of
entry into philosophy of sport involves questions about the nature of sport and its
relation to the concept of play that precedes it.19 For, when we examine the
examples cited above, what are they doing if there isn’t a teleological purpose to
sport? Normally games are considered as being reserved for childish folly, but the
seriousness attributed to sports by the spirited player proves this to be not always
accurate. ‘Play’ has been identified as a central pillar to the field of research in sport
philosophy. Beginning with Johan Huizanga’s Homo Ludens: a Study of the Play
Element in Culture, sport philosophers have been forced to define the practice of
games and sports, while recognizing they are grounded within the greater domain of
play. Huizinga unearths elements of play within all facets of human culture, which
leads him to conclude that play is primary to cultural development, especially

19

Randolph Feezell, Sport, Play, and Ethical Reflection. (University of Illinois Press,
Urbana and Chicago, 2004) p. 4.
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sports. Play transcends that of which is purely physical or purely biological activity,
carrying out a significant function, which suggests there is some sense to it.20
In Western Culture, the inception of the analysis of ‘play’ begins with
Huizinga’s demonstration of its centrality to the development of culture. ‘Play’
theory has been one of the anchors sport philosophers use in defining and
distinguishing between the activities of mere play, games, and sport. One goal was
that with a clear understanding of this interrelationship they could provide a
coherent answer to the question of what constitutes sport? Thereby precisely
delimiting what sport is, so it can be distinguished from the idea of a game, and
account for the continuing influence of play within sport. Play in human culture has
an undeniable relation to sport and games, but poses conceptual problems with the
paradigm used to understand our contemporary sporting environment. Sport is
multi-faceted and ever changing, proven by its wide range from tee-ball leagues for
children, to ultra competitive professional sports leagues. Certainly, the
participation of Ken Griffey Jr. differs from that of little Suzy participating in
afterschool tee-ball. In the examples cited above, both could chose to play for the
simple pleasure gained, but their respective play environments drastically differ
because of the differences in our contemporary sporting range. Our modern gaming
and sporting environment now champion professional performances and various
other compensation in some fashion, as the predominate idea of these derivative
play forms. Contemporary sports have etched a special place in our culture of which
most are quite fond. As a result, fanatical attitudes have matured into the sport
20

Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture. (Hunt,
Barnard and Co., LTD: London and Axlebury, 1944) p. 4.
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industrial complex that has fused commercialism with sport, producing better
athletic theatre than yesteryear. What is most ironic about this combination of
sport and commercialism is the linkage of ordinary means-ended approach to the
whimsical and playful sport concept bereft of any ordinary desires like money.
Right or wrong, athletic performance was inevitably going to be harnessed for
commercial gain because sport’s beauty is so obvious to onlookers familiar and
ignorant alike. The contemporary sporting structure again begs the question of
definition and relation. Modern sport’s tenuous link to play seems especially
pronounced nowadays. Huizinga suggests the following toward the end of Homo
Ludens when discussing the death of play.
In the case of contemporary sport we have an activity nominally
known as play but raised to such a pitch of technical organization
and scientific thoroughness that the real play-spirit is threatened
with extinction.21
The relationship play has to contemporary sport has been fundamentally
perverted due to its association with work-like approaches. A huge shift has
occurred in the way we understand sport from the play mentality. No longer is play
done for its own sake. Sport is primarily practiced and performed in a manner
resembling play, but is no longer truly free without a genuine play attitude. Sport
was once considered to be a fatuous undertaking reserved for youth. However this
idea has flipped on its head and our understanding of sport is being shaped from the
perverted and commodified contemporary form, essentially ceasing as play. The
attitude guiding participation is virtually unrelated to the lusory mentality that
resembles the simplest forms of play. Freedom and choice are so crucial to play,
21

Huizinga, p. 199.
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however, these concepts can only add to the self-meaning the true player
experiences, if contemporary sport is consciously chosen as a pursuit independent
of any other good, which for the most part, it appears not to be. The word amateur
is primarily used to describe such a person, but as Schneider describes the definition
of “no paid sport” presents logical troubles.22 Schneider proposes a positive
definition of amateurism that supports the autotelic and playful qualities in favor of
means-ended conduct typically exhibited in high performance sport.

1.6 Methodology
One major concern of this study is the lusory introspection of the athlete. This will
be achieved by examining three aspects of ‘play’ within sport philosophy. First, the
exact progression of our understanding of ‘play’ within the field sport philosophy
following the seminal anthropological and sociological accounts of ‘play’ identified
by Huizinga and Caillois will be reviewed. Second, a critical analysis of the varying
definitions of what constitutes ‘play’ in sport put forth by relevant sport
philosophers will be examined. Last, an examination of the consequences arising
from our current understanding of these definitions, relative to the contemporary
sporting context involving the sport industrial complex, will be presented. This
lusory introspection uses the framework of accepted definitional concepts of ‘play’
in order to decipher and understand meaning and significance of how we achieve
self-actualization through sport. My quest will use philosophy of sport to explore
the existential meaning and significance of what it means to sincerely ‘play’ sport

22

Angela Schneider, “For the Love of the Game: A Philosophical Defense of
Amateurism,” Quest, No. 45, (4), (1993): p. 462
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while simultaneously navigating the obstacles of one’s own embodiment, the world,
and the human condition.
In order to produce a well-organized account of a subject so broad I intend to
separate the literature into three distinct areas. I will begin with the origin of play
characteristics proposed by Huizinga and Caillois through their respective
anthropological and sociological accounts of the concept. Here, play will be reduced
to the essential characteristics that define its application in the modern sporting
context. From this perspective we can begin to explore the element of absurdity
that is seemingly inherent ‘to play’ when contrasted with concepts of means-ended
work. This contrast will allow us to identify the meaning of play and its impact on
our views of sport and game. I will then turn my attention to the research literature
that attempts to distinguish and define the essence of games and sports, alongside
their relationship with play. The works of Bernard Suits and Ludwig Wittgenstein
will be utilized in attempt to focus on the conceptual analysis of the true structural
framework of games. From this framework we can try to decide on the structural
identity of games and sport, which seem at least initially, virtually identical in
makeup. This provides the framework to determine how the nature of sport as
concept shape normative values of the practice, while demonstrating the added
contribution of ‘play’ to the inherent meaning of the activity. Last, the works of
Klaus Meier and Bernard Suits along with other notable sport philosophers engaged
in a protracted debate over the precise nature of the tricky triad will be reviewed.
What counts as sport, games, and play might seem to be a simple debate of opinion
for the outsider, but it is of principal importance to the philosopher seeking an
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introspective understanding of the true player’s lusory nature. Without attempting
to delimit a general concept to a more specific definition, it is impossible to
prescribe what could be good, and proscribe what is bad. On one level, the moral
dimension of sports and games exist because of how we define these practices,
which in turn, influences the decorum and conduct one must demonstrate to be
engaged in them. It becomes impossible to attempt moral evaluation without a
more precise definition of the essence of them. Therefore, with more definitional
clarity we can better understand the existential meaning experienced by pure
players, and further explore the incongruence of the modern sporting environment
that often abandons the cherished meaning of the ‘play’ concept.
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Chapter 2: Historical and Sociological Genealogies of Play
2.1 Huizinga
Johan Huizinga is among the several esteemed scholars who have published
research examining play theory. Although Huizinga was not the first to recognize
the value of play in explaining human behavior, he is the first scholar in the Western
world, to attempt an exact definition of play and of the various ways it manifests
itself in all spheres of culture, the arts, philosophy, politics, and even legal
institutions and warfare.23 As a cultural historian, Huizinga was primarily
concerned with answering the theoretical question of what constitutes culture, how
and why specific cultures come into being and pass away, how and why they sustain
or fail to sustain themselves, and whether a historian is able to grasp their
configurations.24 Upon considering his cultural research from a macro perspective,
Huizinga arrived at the conclusion of viewing “man” and culture as sub specie ludi.25
Homo Ludens is not the study of play as one of several human processes, but
demonstrates the morphology of play as a phenomenon that precedes and drives
cultural progress. Huizinga’s historical research becomes valuable due the precise
definition he constructs about play through its cultural manifestations.
Huizinga’s initial chapter on the nature and significance of play achieves the
first workable definition of the play phenomenon. It must be pointed out that
Huizinga refers to the generic concept of play in an attempt to refine his definition.
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Fittingly, he identifies play as not being restricted to human beings, after
demonstrating that playful behavior can be observed in animals as well. This
observation led him to determine that play is more than a mere physiological
phenomenon or psychological reflex.26 Play surpasses the boundary of purely
biological activity and should be understood as a significant function, which takes on
greater meaning for humans as it grows in sophistication.27 Huizinga determined
that the significance of play revolves around its status as a phenomenon, and this
new explanation for play weakened the logic upholding previous biological accounts
rendering them untenable.28 Prior to the current philosophical study of play, it was
assessed from the perspective of psychology and physiology. According to Huizinga,
these disciplines are steeped in the scientific method of observation and variable
manipulation in order to isolate the cause that can serve as the basis for logical
explanation of the science.29 The scientific notion of play is profoundly flawed
because the scientific outlook presupposes a general biological function, which is
not the case with play. Huizinga recounts the multitude of biological suppositions
used to rationalize play such as the discharge of superabundant energy, imitative
instinct, preparatory simulation for maturity, and the need for relaxation or
distraction.30 These beliefs don’t support the idea of play as a self-serving concept
distinct from regular means-end activity. The accounts of play justifying a biological
purpose ultimately lead to conceptual problems since this rationale doesn’t
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determine the true essence of play according to Huizinga, but at best might describe
its possible benefits. According to Huizinga, early scientific accounts of play were
doomed to fail at the outset because they assume a logical connection between play
activity and biological purpose that is not necessarily the case.31
Huizinga charts a new course and directs his attention to the aesthetic
phenomenon of play. Play captivates a certain level of attention both from the
player and potential spectators surrounding the activity. Normally the activity
carries a certain noticeable pleasure, possibly even electricity that is palpable for
those involved allowing them to become lost in the moment. The phenomenal
property of play is the backbone supporting Huizinga’s definition. Previous
researchers on the subject steeped in scientific methodology couldn’t acknowledge
this aspect because it transcends scientific analysis. Huizinga defends the
phenomenal account of play by stating, “Yet in this intensity, this absorption, this
power of maddening, lies the very essence, the primordial quality of play.”32
Huizinga’s phenomenal account of play can’t be subject to scientific scrutiny, and
can’t be reduced to fit another category of human process, because it is its own end
according to Huizinga. Huizinga certifies his point about play’s phenomenal nature
by again invoking the example of animals at play suggesting, “The reality of play
extends beyond the sphere of human life and it cannot have its foundations in any
rational nexus, because this would limit it to mankind.”33 With the departure from
rational sensibilities, play contains a decided illogicality, especially for human kind.
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I agree with Huizinga regarding the misapplication of scientific analysis when
studying play for all reasons stated above. Play is very much a phenomenon better
studied through the refinement of a theoretical definition. A definition can always
be used to delimit a particular phenomenon, however science cannot accurately
grasp the nonsensical nature of the activity. External standards cannot make sense
of the conduct, and this is precisely the reason that play is a self-predicable concept
for Huizinga. Therefore biological accounts of play can’t suffice as a definition
because science can’t conceive of this elusive self-serving nature inherent within
play, especially since it doesn’t contribute to any psychological or biological end.34
Upon understanding play as a distinct, fundamental, supra-logical concept, Huizinga
begins constructing a definition determined by five characteristics.
For play to occur it must be non-serious in order to escape the determinism
of the universal order. By suggesting this non-serious nature for the activity
Huizinga is not requiring an attitude of complete levity. However, the agent can’t
approach play with the sense of seriousness one would normally exhibit otherwise
in the means-ended activity found in ordinary life. This is quite different than the
greater standard of “not serious” because anyone can attest that play can be taken
very seriously upon witnessing the run-of-the-mill schoolyard populated with
children playing earnestly in order to complete the game within the window of a
brief recess. Therefore, the qualification of “non”(serious) eliminates the conceptual
difficulties involved with a completely frivolous outlook, while not progressing to
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the complete opposite end of the spectrum of complete and utter seriousness.35
There is a balance point that, it could be suggested, is analogous to the theory of the
golden mean posited by Aristotle which states, a virtue is the balance point between
deficiency and excess.36 Upon establishing a foundation of play grounded in nonseriousness Huizinga provides the characteristics that define play. Prior to
proposing his definition, he forwards an important caveat in order to limit the broad
scope of the play concept. Huizinga seeks to examine play in relation to culture;
therefore he need not scrutinize all the forms of play, as he is only concerned with
its sociocultural manifestations. Herein, Huizinga makes an important distinction by
identifying that play exists in sophisticated and primitive forms. Sophisticated
forms of play that manifest in our social environment are at Huizinga’s delimitations
of play. Primitive forms of play exist outside the realm of cultural history; therefore
Huizinga is justified in excluding it from his analysis. Nevertheless, he
acknowledges primitive play exists, providing greater credence to his
comprehensive navigation of this previously uncharted element of the human
experience.
The first principal aspect of play is the voluntary nature of it.37 Play cannot
continue to be defined as so, if the agent is participating involuntarily or is subject to
direction. Play should be considered nonessential, and its meaning derives from the
potential enjoyment of voluntarily choosing it. Thus, play cannot be mandated
outside of the solemn cultural functions Huizinga identifies, and can be stopped by
35
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the agent at any point because one chooses to be involved. Ultimately, for Huizinga,
play can be considered akin to the overall idea of freedom, because it represents the
acme of liberal activity. With respect to this characteristic I wholeheartedly agree
with Huizinga and would like to emphasize its importance for the purposes of my
argument. The voluntary nature of play relates back to absurdum in existential
philosophy that suggests our lives have no inherent meaning. Therefore, any
possible meaning in our lives must be chosen voluntarily otherwise it isn’t a
demonstration of our free will. I’m unwilling to accept that extraneous inducements
beyond the realm of play are acceptable to the amateur38 player. They don’t
represent a coercive force requiring the player to take action, but they do impede
making a choice for something, in and of its own good, independent of another. For
the pursuit to bear the fruit of deep personal meaning it can’t be chosen for any
reason beyond that of intrinsic fulfillment. The ability to exercise free will because
of our special cognitive gifts doesn’t necessitate that work be our central purpose.
Finding meaning from self-actualization in a pursuit significant to the individual is
central to those who are truly free. Work for its own sake is bondage, but play exists
throughout all facets of our civilization for people to exercise complete freedom.
Huizinga discovered play under nearly every rock in the social landscape.39 It’s
simply ironic that something so ordinarily insignificant as sport can unshackle a
person and give them ultimate freedom if it is chosen for the right reasons.
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Huizinga’s second characteristic describes the concept of the magic circle,
quite possibly the most famous and distinguishing feature of play. Play is distinct
and separate from ordinary life, existing in a temporary sphere of activity with a
disposition all its own according to Huizinga. This distinct sphere where play occurs
is fundamentally dependent upon the non-serious requirement integral to play.
Play and seriousness exist as polar opposites in Huizinga’s understanding of play. In
order to enter the play sphere the agent must suspend ordinary seriousness, only to
the reawaken the traditional means-ended outlook upon play’s termination. Play
exists within everyday life; however it is distinct from ordinary life, since it occurs in
its own time place. This characteristic is best understood by the pretend nature of
the play activity, for example consider the childhood game ‘Cops and Robbers.’ It is
obvious to anyone witnessing such childish tomfoolery that the participants are only
pretending, but internally they consider themselves to be as cunning as John
Dillinger while matched with the resolve of a Melvin Purvis. The pretend quality of
play doesn’t preclude them from possible serious involvement within play, but
pretending betrays a consciousness of the inferiority of play compared with
ordinary seriousness, a feeling that seems to be something as primary as play
itself.40
Play is not subjected to the confines of ordinary life, it exists beyond the
immediate satisfaction of natural wants and appetites. It interrupts the normal
human appetitive process of means-ended behavior. Play becomes the interlude
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within quotidian life.41 Play is incorporated within our lives; however it serves no
purpose beyond itself. The beauty of it, as alluded to earlier in the introduction, is
that it begins as an amusement or distraction; however, it becomes the
accompaniment, the complement, in fact an integral part of life in general.42
Without play we cease to possess the glimmer that enrich our very souls.
Huizinga’s third point completes the distinct magic circle concept, by
asserting that play not only exists in a separate region from ordinary life but also
temporal period. The magic circle concept has play occurring in a distinct time and
place, withdrawn from the ordinary possessing its own progression and meaning.
The magic circle is a name for this abstract consecrated setting where play occurs
separate from the ordinary. An apt example of this is Sanford stadium on the
campus of the University of Georgia, where supporters unintentionally illustrate the
separation of the magic circle by using a particularly apropos expression. In
reference to the ornamental privet hedge bordering the stadium playing field, the
Georgia football team play’s its home games “Between the Hedges.”43 Within the
stadium, a perimeter of privet hedges surrounds the field demarcating the
consecrated football field from the other. The passion of play unfolds within the
enclosure of the hedges spawning a temporary world encapsulated by the looming
presence of the ordinary world of the university’s campus. Georgia football zealots
constantly refer to the metonym as opposed to the stadium’s proper name,
41
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implicitly acknowledging and celebrating the preeminence of the “magic circle
dedicated to the performance of an act apart.”44 Within the confines of the magic
circle new meaning is infused within those playing because the world they inhabit is
completely detached from the nonplaying world, yet enveloped by it. This is largely
attributed to Huizinga’s fourth point of play’s absolute and peculiar order.45 For
play to occur in the sophisticated cultural spheres Huizinga identifies that play
demands absolute order. Ordinary life is full of confusion and uncertainty, while
play institutes a temporary limited type of perfection brought about by the harmony
of adhering to an overarching rule structure. The rules that sanction play are
sacrosanct, allowing for the maintenance of the play sphere operating from a new
point of consciousness. This new cosmos enchants the player because the
institution of rules places the ultimate goal achievement at risk, providing tension
that the player must overcome by achieving an objective. Although play transcends
the evaluative moral critiques of “good or bad,” “right or wrong,” an ethical aspect
emerges from the player’s motivation to relieve the tension within the contest by
achieving the objective while complying with the rules. The rules are essential to
the continued maintenance of the play-concept’s order. Without rules, play is
robbed of its harmonious perfectibility, and ceases to exist. The play world is fragile
and the play community can be robbed of the play illusion by a simple transgression
of the tenets upholding its constitution. Therefore, the ideal player acknowledges
the order of the play world by way of the rules, but doesn’t view them as hindrance
but something to be embraced because it is the essence of the endeavor.
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Finally, Huizinga’s last characteristic of play derives from the idea that play is
completely self-serving.46 With the initiation and existence of the play world,
completely divorced from the ordinary pleasures serving our normal appetitive
process become suspended, and are inconsequential within the play world. Play
begins and ends with itself, producing nothing beyond itself. Upon the termination
of the play sphere, one can seek to satisfy these natural processes, but the play
world can’t contribute to external material gain from the ordinary world.
By combining the essential characteristics of play outlined, Huizinga provides
the first scholarly definition of the play concept,
Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free
activity standing quite consciously outside “ordinary” life as being
“not serious,” but at the same time absorbing the player intensely
and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and
no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper
boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an
orderly manner.47
Upon equipping us with the general definition of play, Huizinga sets out to
demonstrate how play manifests itself within specific segments of our culture in the
form of competition or agonistic struggle. Among Huizinga’s best examples is the
play form in philosophy itself. He recounts back to the days of antiquity and the
reverence paid to the sophist of the period, specifically citing the famed
Protagoras.48 The sophist’s principal goal was to demonstrate exceptional
knowledge, while overcoming the objections of their interlocutor in the dialectic.
The truth need not be central to the sophist’s purpose unlike the genuine
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philosopher. Plato condemned sophists for using deceitful and misleading
rhetorical tricks to manipulate others into accepting fallacious arguments.49 The
rejection of sophistry did not bring about the end of play within philosophy.
Philosophy maintains playful features due to its nature as a contest, despite
pursuing gravely serious questions concerning things like the essence of truth,
epistemology, and morality. The Socratic method, a staple in the corpus of Platonic
dialogues perfectly encapsulates what Huizinga describes as, “ancient philosophy’s
close association with play in the form of contest.”50 Philosophical thought arises in
a competitive process of the dialectal method governed by the rule and order of
factual truths derived from the refinement of logical truth between the
interlocutors. The play element is relevant in ancient philosophy because in the
case of Protagoras, he operates outside of the supreme order of truth seeking;
therefore, he doesn’t practice philosophy.51 In order for the play element to exist,
the sophist must disregard his roundabout rhetoric used to win the argument
because the magic circle that fosters play in the form of philosophy occurs as a
contest and can’t proceed without the interlocutors advancing what they
understand to be a factual truth.52 While philosophy is not mere ‘play,’ it has
nonetheless preserved playful characteristics.
Homo Ludens concludes with a chapter that specifically evaluates the
sporting aspect of play. Huizinga expresses a dreary outlook on the modern
sporting conception of the play element, possibly coming to the conclusion that our
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contemporary culture marks the death of play as a phenomenon that breeds and
evolves culture.53 According to Huizinga, the 19th Century marks the period where
sport transitions from occasional amusement to the system of organized clubs and
matches. During this period, England became the cradle of modern sporting life with
increased systemization and regimentation for physical activity, robbing sport of its
pure play-quality.54 Huizinga perceives that the disparate terms, ‘professional’ and
‘amateur,’ originating from this period, perfectly capture the idea of play’s
termination, because it no longer possesses elements of non-seriousness and
freedom. This sort of classification system of ranking participants suggests a
hierarchy that considers sport means-ended. Distinguishing between the two
approaches marks out those for whom playing is no longer play, ranking them
inferior to the true players in standing, but superior in performance of task.55 Sport
ceases to be play if approached from a serious manner, as Huizinga has noted, play
is essentially non-serious. This is the primary difficulty with the modern sports
occurring during the inter war years when Homo Ludens was written, which pales
in comparison to the contemporary standards that treat sport as being about life or
death. Ultimately, the play concept is at deep conflict within the modern sporting
culture that confuses the nature of seriousness. Within sport we have an activity
nominally known as play, but raised to such a pitch of technical organization and
scientific thoroughness that the real play spirit is threatened with extinction.56
Professional sports often retain elements such as spirited competition, commitment
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to excellence, and teamwork. However this all occurs within the structure of a
performance with some spontaneous elements.
Huizinga depicts contemporary civilization as one in which material
interests, cynicism, and the negation of every norm not only exists (as they always
have), but are elevated into absolutes in place of the rules that underlie all play, all
noble activity, and all honorable competition. The decadence of play is evident in the
breakdown of the distinction between play and seriousness, whereby the serious
business of life politics, war, economics, and morality degenerate into pseudo-play,
and play loses its indispensable qualities of spontaneity, detachment, joy, and thus,
its power to act as a culture-creating activity. The decadence of play is evident also
in the commercialization, professionalization, and politicization of sport, which
perverts recreation and reduces it to crude sensationalism. Today we celebrate the
dramatic and extraordinary elements of sport. The technical nuance and
appreciation for minute skill has vanished, only to be replaced by an insatiable
appetite for spectacular performance. It is evident in the perversion of culture by
puerilism, which, for Huizinga, instead of making boys into men, adapts the conduct
of the community to that of the adolescent age.57 All of this, Huizinga concludes,
clearly shows that there can be no civilization without play and rules of fair play,
without conventions consciously established and voluntarily adhered to, and
without knowledge of how to win and lose graciously. The supreme importance to
civilization of the play factor is precisely that, "Civilization presupposes limitation
and mastery of the self, the ability not to confuse its own tendencies with the
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ultimate and highest goal, but to understand that it is enclosed within certain
bounds freely accepted."58
Huizinga’s purpose is not sport-centered, in fact he seems rather
unconcerned with sport or its close relative, ‘game.’ Huizinga uses the occasional
sport example up until his last chapter to elucidate his definition of play, but he
doesn’t pursue identifying the interrelationship of what became labeled play, game,
and sport because it is beyond the scope of his purpose. The significance of
Huizinga’s Homo Ludens is his definition of play. Nonetheless, he seems to stumble
into the space where play and games intersect, but they are proven to be distinct as
pointed out by Carlson later in this section.

2.2 Caillois
Roger Caillois’ account of play in his book Man, Play and Games is a direct response
to what he considers the definitional shortcomings of Huizinga’s Homo Ludens,
while examining play through a sociological lens. Caillois draws conclusions that
are quite similar to Huizinga, in regard to the definition of play and the
characteristics that support it. While Caillois acknowledges the importance of his
predecessor’s thesis linking cultural development to exploration of the play
element, he correctly reasons that Huizinga left much of the play concept
unexplored.59 Caillois charts a different path, seeking a comprehensive definition of
the play concept in consideration of all its variations and applications for humanity.
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Huizinga discovers play in non-traditional areas we wouldn’t normally consider
throughout Home Ludens, but his general view on play seems to be influenced most
by the competitive contest. He further refines Huizinga’s original definition, while
further expanding the sphere of play by introducing his typology of games and
cementing their relationship to play.60 Caillois immediately begins to address the
inadequacies of Homo Ludens, most principally Huizinga’s omission of games in
relation to his understanding of the play element. However, he recognizes the scope
of Huizinga’s research precluded him from exploring this aspect of play similarly
present in games, because his focus rested on the generation and spawning of
cultural practices through play. The first section of Man, Play, and Games is
dedicated to refining Huizinga’s original definition and classifying the different
types of play occurring. This section of his book on the definition of play is the
primary focus of this paper; however, it is not concerned with sociological theory
that Caillois delves into towards the second half of the book. As a sport philosopher,
the brunt of my focus will be on the clarity of Caillois progression in formulating a
correct definition, and its possible utility for achieving my research goal.

Caillois begins by unveiling reworked definitional characteristics similar to
Huizinga’s original definition of play. He, too, agrees that play is first and foremost a
free and voluntary activity considered as a source of joy and amusement.61
According to Caillois who followed in the wake of Huizinga, the player must be able
to choose participation freely and terminate play at any point he desires, because it
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only serves as a diversion to escape quotidian life.62 The free activity described
occurs within Huizinga’s protected space described as the magic circle. The game’s
domain is therefore a restricted, closed, protected universe: a pure space.63 In
addition, the rules provide play with intrinsic value because they are unique to the
magic circle. Caillois adds to this idea by suggesting that ordinary laws become
suspended in favor of new laws unique to the magic circle that are singularly
enforced These elements of the definition of play are holdovers from Huizinga, but
Caillois institutes three changes to the characteristics in order to give his account of
play.
First, Caillois points out Huizinga incorrectly asserts that play is uninvolved
with material profit or gain.64 Huizinga doesn’t subscribe to the idea of betting
games, and those of chance, belonging to the realm of play, as he suggests play
involves no material interest.65 Caillois reasons that the casino dealer doesn’t play
in games of chance; however the tension felt by the casino players as they passively
await the resolution of an uncertain situation represents the capriciousness of
chance that constitutes just another type of game.66 According to Caillois, property
can be exchanged among the players in a zero sum game, but his view of games
seems heavily influenced by the perspective of ordinary work aiming for
production.67 Caillois suggests no external goods are generated as result of
participation, which demonstrates his inclination towards comparing the play world
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with the ordinary means-ended world. Therefore, this example leads Caillois to
characterize play as an occasion of pure waste, in the sense that it represents the
passing of productive time that doesn’t yield fruit.68 Since Huizinga regards play as
incompatible with profit or the gaining of material interests, there is no room for
games of chance in his definition of play. Caillois seeks to remedy the problem of
material inducements by arguing that while play has to be unproductive, it need not
preclude the players from exchanging property or wealth with one another.69 The
goal of play cannot be to produce anything external to the play sphere such as
money, but they still may fully experience the characteristics that circumscribe play
if limited transfer while forbidding production of entirely new external benefits.
The players’ attitudes, if they are indeed playing must reflect this attitude, otherwise
they are involved in something else that is not play. Caillois’ tenet mandating the
absence of external goods serves to exclude professional players from playing.
Caillois’ definition creates a dichotomous relationship between play and extrinsic
reward that is irreconcilable. Caillois considers play as sort of zero-sum game.
There is no productive value at all when playing, hence the idea of pure waste, or an
unproductive nature, relative to the ordinary means-ended approach. Play is
something that is a good in itself. It has internal goods that are the primary reason
for participating and engaging in the play. But this does not exclude the possibility of
external factors playing a part in conjunction with the intrinsic nature of the activity.
Many things can both be goods-in-themselves while at the same time still being
constitutive of other goods. Huizinga’s requirement of play’s intrinsic exclusivity, or
68
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the complete corruptive nature external goods have on the intrinsic seems
erroneous and unwarranted. External elements can exist within play as Caillois
rightly posits; however, his error rests in the play world’s relative comparison to
means-ended work production.
Second, Caillois proposes that play possesses a fictive component that can
stand in place of the traditional rule order previously mentioned by Huizinga that
protects and maintains the magic circle. Where Huizinga only gives primitive play a
cursory overview, Caillois focuses on this type of play, further expanding the range
of the play concept. Primitive play doesn’t necessarily subscribe to rules; therefore
it is the freest form of spontaneous play usually in the form of improvisation.70 The
absence of binding rules in games like ‘cops and robbers’ requires affirmation of a
fictive play element in order to maintain the play sphere. For Caillois the fictive
element in primitive play serves the same purpose of rule order. This awareness of
basic the unreality of the assumed behavior is separate from real life and from the
arbitrary legislation that defines other games.71 Failing to acknowledge this
awareness quashes the play illusion, returning the player back to the ordinary. 72
Caillois effectively points out play isn’t subject to rule order and fiction to maintain
the magic circle, it is either ruled ordered or fictitious.
Last, there is a source of uncertainty inherent to play. This is similar to
Huizinga’s concept of tension but more accurately defined. Consider for example
the difference between the home team trailing by one run, and conversely holding a
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five-run lead during the 9th inning while down to its last out of a baseball game. In
the former circumstance the crowd would be waving towels and cheering knowing
one swing of the bat can tie the game. That tension and electricity described by
Huizinga sweeps through those involved because the action is still unfolding and is
far from resolved. In the latter case, the play sphere dissolves because the
circumstances have eliminated the element of uncertainty upon the resolution of
play. Hence why in the latter situation, the visitor’s 27th out signals the point when
teams will promptly retire to the showers, thereby ignoring the legislated rules
maintaining the play order by foregoing their ‘at bat’ because nothing more can be
decided in game because it is won, decisively. The same is true for other sports
where a team firmly secures facile victory. Nothing is more anticlimactic than a
contest decided by half time because one team is significantly overmatched.
Certainty is the antithesis of play, since it removes the latitude of a player’s control
over his or her own circumstance when the game as been essentially determined.
Well-executed play, at least in sport, flows from beautifully-improvised reaction in
response to one’s opponent working in harmonious concert. The obligation to
operate within the framework of the rules brings rise to the moral component of the
activity in structured play, as previously introduced. For Caillois and myself, the just
result is one that is uncertain, and by continuing the uncertainty within the play
sphere, one can remain at play in this dynamic with an opponent.
In summation Caillois describes the characteristics comprising play as: (1)
free activity/choice: (2) a play sphere separated by space and time: (3) uncertain
course of action: (4) unproductive state of affairs: (5) governed by rules: and (6)
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operating within a fictitious reality (Caillois, p. 9).73 This definition doesn’t diverge
much from Huizinga’s which states: (1) play is voluntary: (2) it is different from
ordinary affairs especially those of material interest: (3) it is secluded or limited by
special times, places, and cultural configurations: (4) explores tension and balance
within the framework of the rules: and (5) characterized by secrecy and disguise.74
Thomas Henricks, a contemporary play theorist, recognizes Caillois’ work as
a response to Homo Ludens that fortifies the play concept in a subtle way.75 Upon
analysis of the two definitions, both Huizinga and Caillois seem to generally agree on
play’s basic structure, as Caillois makes only the slightest revisions to Huizinga’s
original definition.76 Henrick asserts about Huizinga,
Against the long-standing philosophical tradition of homo sapienshumans as thinkers-and the materialist thesis of homo faber-humans as
makers-Huizinga advances his claim for homo ludens-humans as playersa vision of people as active explorers and negotiators of societal
possibility. In Huizinga’s view, people have an impulse to play that
cannot be explained by other factors or elements of human society or
nature. This creative impulse has been critical to processes of societal
self-consciousness and renewal throughout history. Because of this,
contemporary societies should be careful not to restrict or corrupt the
very activity that forms one basis of their existence.77

Henrick’s believes Caillois’ sociological arguments of ritualized behavior
guaranteeing the purity of sacred spaces like play suggests he shares a similar antiutilitarian spirit with Huizinga.78 However, I would like to point out that Caillois
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makes a radical departure from the extensive umbrella of Huizinga’s definition of
play only to once again qualify the player according to the purpose of production,
the ultimate goal of homo faber. Huizinga simply precludes play from being useful
for external goods in his definition, while Caillois considers play relative to function
in determining that it is unproductive. Such language implies play is being
measured against conduct that is means-ended, which I see as a key misstep by
Caillois.

2.3 Caillois’ Play Continuum and Typology of Games
Despite this misstep during the assembly of a definition, Caillois’ addition to the
literature is significant because he evolves his theory from Huizinga’s broad account
of play to include the close relation of the concept of game. Caillois specifically
defines the multiple forms of ‘game’ that contribute to his refined definition of play.
Caillois distinguishes between play and games, representing the first logical
progression assisting sport philosophers with determining the relationship between
the more recent concept of the ‘tricky triad.’ By expanding his definition of ‘play’ to
utilize a typology of ‘game’ Caillois should be credited with improving the
definitional concept. He highlights the different experiences sensed by the player
throughout a wide range of games. However, he is unable to precisely outline the
essence of the specie ‘game’ independent of the play concept. Caillois simply
subsumes it under the genus play. Caillois’ definitional structure seems to fall into
the trap of conflating the concepts of ‘game’ and ‘play’, posited by Carlson in the next
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section. Caillois views games on a wide spectrum differentiating games by elements
of competition, chance, simulation, and vertigo.79
Caillois’ typology of games is a fundamental aspect to his text, primarily
because it structures the range of experience from primitive play all the way to
highly structured play.80 The typology of games forwarded by Caillois doesn’t
differentiate between types of game using mental or physical skills, but solely on the
basis of how each game’s framework draws distinctive play characteristics. This
leads to the identification of four types of game forms: Agon, Alea, Mimicry, and Ilinx.
Each of the four forms represent a similar general nature of game, but the division
between each form rests on Caillois’ innovative concept of a ‘play’ continuum that
seems to begin identifying games and the serious activity of sports as being
determined by the structure of the activity. He designates one end of the continuum
to represent paidia.81 Paidia is viewed as completely unstructured, frolicsome, and
frivolous. The polar opposite end of the play continuum is designated as ludus.
Ludus signifies activity that is purposeful, contains artificial restrictions, and
requires tremendous skill and effort to overcome these impediments. The range of
play on Caillois’ continuum is linked with the range of experience a player
undergoes when moving along from primitive play to high performance activity.
Caillois suitably identifies the structural mechanisms that dictate the range of
experience within the play sphere that are a central element of games within the
following classification table.
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Figure 1: Classification of Games82

AGÔN
(Competition)
PAIDIA
Tumult
Agitation
Immoderate laughter

Kite-flying
Solitaire
Patience
Crossword puzzles

Racing
Wrestling
Etc.
Athletics

not
regulated

ALEA
(Chance)

MIMICRY
(Simulation)

ILINX
(Vertigo)

Counting-out
rhymes
Heads or tails

Children’s
initiations
Games of illusion
Tag, Arms
Masks, Disguises

Children “whirling”
Horseback riding
Swinging
Waltzing

Boxing, Billiards
Fencing, Checkers
Football, Chess

Betting
Roulette

Contests, Sports in general

Simple,
complex, and
continuing
lotteries

LUDUS

Theater
Spectacles in
general

Volador
Traveling carnivals
Skiing
Mountain Climbing
Tightrope walking

* In each vertical column games are classified in such an order that the paidia element is constantly decreasing
while the ludus element is ever increasing.

Caillois’ four ‘game’ types expand immensely upon Huizinga’s early account
of ‘play’, which assimilates all cultural play activities occurring into the form of a
contest.83 Caillois uses the play continuum to sort between different activities
belonging to his four games categories. The combination of the concepts play and
game represents the confusion alluded to earlier, and will be addressed further in
the next section on Carlson’s idea of the conflation of play and game. The table
above provides a clear illustration of how Caillois orders and defines activity
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according to the play continuum with the sub-set of each type of game. Like his
predecessor, Caillois begins with the most recognizable game form to humanity, that
he terms Agon. These ‘games’ reflect the ludus pole of the play spectrum taking the
forms of game and sport within the framework of a ‘contest.’ Typically these
contests begin from a point of equality, attempting to balance the chances of
winning for either side.84 The play form presupposes sustained attention and skill
development on the player’s part according to the structured ludus pole of the
spectrum that restricts the player to operate within the framework of the rules.85
The game type Alea poses a fundamental contrast with Agon. Such play excludes the
decision-making power of the player and the outcome is no longer subject to their
control. In this case, fortune is the sole determinant of success in this play form
because they have relinquished all control to elements of chance. However, both
play forms can be combined into a hybridized style of play. Caillois cites the
example of card games where blind luck (Alea) and optimal strategy (Agon) combine
to make the play world more thrilling than it otherwise would due to the
uncertainty.86 Agon and Alea imply opposite and somewhat complementary
attitudes, but they both obey the same law in creating the conditions of pure
equality denied in real life.87 The perfected nature of the background conditions, in
combination with the rule-bound structure is what makes the play world special in
this instance. Most importantly this development exposes the inadequacy of
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Huizinga’s parochial account of play as only occurring in the form of a contest.88 The
fact that a range of experiences can be faced possibly in conjunction with one
another seems to progress the complexity of play’s multi-faceted nature especially
when contrasted with Caillois’ two remaining categories. Mimicry is the third play
form identified by Caillois, which greatly expands the possibility of what activities
can be considered play. Caillois defines mimicry as follows;
Presupposing the temporary and free acceptance, if not of an illusion
(illusion is a word with loaded meaning deriving from the
combination of the Latin preposition and stem, literally meaning in a
state of play), then at least of closed, conventional, and, in certain
respects, imaginary universe.89

The player attempts to escape from him or herself through playful illusion in
order to construct and truly be something or someone of make-believe. Such
behavior contains all the necessary characteristics to be classified as play since it
occurs freely, within the magic circle, has a sense of order, and possesses an obvious
fictitious element supporting the play sphere.90 Mimicry begins as we move further
away from ludus end of the continuum, towards the paidia end. This type of playful
behavior is witnessed in all sorts of activity. Caillois cites the common example of a
child’s tendency to mimic adult behavior, such as the previous example used of ‘cops
and robbers.’ However, Caillois provides a most surprising example of adult
mimicry we ordinarily wouldn’t recognize as play, in the dramatic arts.91 It becomes
reasonable to surmise this form of play is where theatre gets the colloquial
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appellation “a play.” The play element present is the transformation to something
considered other, and distinct from self, while remaining consciously grounded in
the fact of creating an illusion. The actor does not try to make you truly believe that
he is really the tragic hero Oedipus. It’s only the real life spy who attempts to
convince themself of their deception because they aren’t playing, their conduct is
profoundly serious.92
In examining the play element, the spectators or non-participants have been
largely overlooked mainly by Huizinga. Caillois brilliantly points out that mimicry
isn’t reserved for the aforementioned situations, but occurs in conjunction with the
contest as well.93 Due to the required nature of uncertainty as a fundamental
characteristic of the contest, Caillois suggests the spectator demonstrates an
inclination towards identifying with a champion.94 I submit that identifying with the
champion player in itself constitutes mimicry, similar to the emotions that captivate
the reader allowing them to visualize and live within the precarious and uncertain
world of their protagonist. Daniel Wann and Nyla Branscombe describe the sporting
equivalent of this form of mimicry as basking in reflected glory (BIRGing).95 Wann &
Branscombe theories derive from the field of psychology. Their analysis of the
concept of BIRGing is rooted social identity theory (Wann & Branscombe, p.107).96
This explains how one’s self esteem can be influenced by another individual’s
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success through identifying with them vicariously.97 Wann & Branscombe suggest a
natural connection develops when a spectator becomes enamored with a person or
group playing in a contest due to shared characteristics. The cultural value of play
in the form of contest is undeniable and is pointed in Huizinga’s first analysis of play
in Homo Ludens.98 Sports easily rival works of great cultural significance like novels
and movies from the standpoint of mimicry. However, sports events are
nevertheless special occasions for mimcry, since the simulation is transferred from
the participants to the spectating audience.99 Identification with the champion in
itself (BIRGing) constitutes mimicry related to that of the reader with the hero of a
novel. The captivity of sport on the spectator surpasses the playful mimicry of a
reader because the potential hero playing in the contest struggles to attain a desired
but unrealized end that is uncertain, unlike the classic book that invariable ends in
the with the same resolution. Despite the uncertainty in sport, the fanatical
spectator has already envisioned or dreamt of the desired end through imitative
play, explaining their euphoric craze once their hero has been crowned.

The final play form proposed by Caillois is completely unstructured and
nonsensical. “Ilinx is the pursuit of vertigo and which consist of an attempt to
momentarily destroy the stability of perception and inflict a kind of voluptuous
panic upon an otherwise lucid mind.” 100 Ironically the very name ilinx derives from
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the Greek word for vertigo Ilingos.101 This form of play achieves the temporary
escape from normal sensory perception, opening up an entirely other world that is
euphoric and exhilarating. This type of experience is not achieved easily when
limited to one’s own body, the body cannot generate the speed or flight required to
sense vertigo. However, with instruments and technology, spectacular exploits are
now becoming more common, whether that be the circus acrobat, or the lunacy of
base jumpers and wind-suit pilots. Therefore, I’m of the belief that thrill seekers
who push the limits of their bodies through untraditional and perilous means,
experience play, in the form of Ilingos, just as a ball player would, but can also
receive the added benefit of complete rapture. Regardless of the nature of their
chosen activity, being decidedly different from traditional games they are involved
within a type of activity that provides them a similar play experience that contains
all the six characteristics of play but from a different experience brought on by the
pursuit of vertigo.

2.4 The Conflation of Play
Chad Carlson is a contemporary sport philosopher who suggests that the question of
the connection between play and games is an important question that is yet to be
adequately answered. Carlson finds faults within the analysis of Huizinga and
Caillois’ definition of play, grouping other later play theorists with making the
similar mistake of conflation.102 The aforementioned authors fit into a pattern of
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depicting an ambiguous, or otherwise confusing, description of play and game.103
This mistake has resulted in what Carlson describes as the conflation of play and
game. Conflation is the unwarranted combining of two things into one, especially
concerning similar phenomena whose differences are often overlooked, ignored, or
mistaken.104 Carlson specifically posits that Huizinga’ conditions, that lead to his
definition, is the origin of the conflation.105 Huizinga fails to distinguish clearly
between two aspects of lived experience.106 These ambiguities result in play being
understood as a combination between an approach to doing something, and the
particular thing that is being done.107 Huizinga’s initial characteristics such as being
voluntary, free, and absorbing the player intensely and utterly, speak to a player’s
attitude or stance towards the activity in question.108 Yet, some of the remaining
characteristics are those of how activities are conducted such as fixed rules and
order. Huizinga establishes his definition of play using a hybrid account of an
attitudinal approach and an activity based understanding of it. Arising from this is
the problem clarity between play and games.109 Chad Carlson’s highlights the
problem regarding the conflation, while also providing the precise criteria for
distinguishing between play and games. Carlson goes on to explain the idea of
conflation and how original definitions of play mislead previous sport
philososphers.
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Play exists while demonstrating an autotelic approach to the world,
essentially participating because the pursuits chosen are ends in and of
themselves. Play can also be described as the thing which one is engaged for
example climbing trees, building sandcastles, or simply hitting the baseball
without the presence of fielders. Similarly games are also understood as
things, activities, and conventions like chess, Sudoku, or football. But we also
refer to gaming as an attitude, perhaps an ironic or gratuitous attitude of
looking for and taking on unnecessary problems. Thus, it would be reasonable
to distinguish playing from play activities and gaming from game activities.
Playing and gaming, as stances or attitudes, are ways in which we do things.
They are distinct intentionalities toward the projects we encounter. For
playing, the intentionality or act is autotelic, while for gaming it is lusory
essentially aiming at a solution of an unnecessary problem. Conflation
problems stem from a failure to properly highlight these distinctions and
accurately characterize them. On the side of intentionality- that is the side of
attitudes, stances, and approaches to the world it becomes apparent that the
play stance and the gaming attitude are distinct and compatible. That is, they
have a life of their own, but they also overlap. We see their overlap in the
compound or nested intentionality of what Suits ambiguously calls game
playing. It is and intentionality that is both autotelic and lusory at the same
time. Game players, in the deepest sense of those terms, are looking for
engaging artificial problems as an end in itself.110

Carlson’s argument certainly exposes the possibility that Huizinga seems to
conflate play with the close relationship it has with games. This produces the
unintended result of defining play using the nearly identical structural criteria of a
game. Following Huizinga, philosophers of sport credit his work defining play as a
critical milestone to work from, making possible the further distinctions between
the nature of sports and games. The agent participating in games and sports has a
play like attitude that exemplifies these structured activities that are grounded
within the domain of play. Huizinga doesn’t attempt to chart the connections
between games and sports, however, it is clear he views them as both possessing
playful characteristics. This is primarily due to the fact that Huizinga conceives of
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play from the standpoint of competition or agonistic struggle.111 Such a narrow
perspective on play’ is what constitutes the extent of play in his pioneering
definition, according to Henricks.
Caillois’ classification of games within play similarly contributes towards a
logical confusion of the two concepts.112 This stems from the alternating use of the
concept of ‘play ‘ and ‘game’ in the second chapter of Man, Play, Games.113 A major
objection requiring serious consideration involves the distinguished factors
between ‘play’ and ‘game’ that are no longer so clearly defined after Caillois’ theory
on their relationship has been established. Within the scope of Man, Play, and
Games, game and sport remain impregnated within the motherly domain of play,
not yet mature enough to be considered distinct entities.
The amorphous relation Caillois draws between play and game doesn’t help
in outlining what constitutes a game. This is especially troubling in the initial two
chapters: ‘The Definition of Play,’ and ‘The Classification of Games,’ that are
predicated on definitional advancement of Huizinga’s original work.114 Caillois uses
the terms ‘play’ and ‘game’ interchangeably, first reworking Huizinga’s definition of
play, but upon transitioning to his typology of ‘play,’ he uses the term ‘games’
referring to the same concept.115 The shift in terminology occurs without any
indication of a transition from one phenomenon to another.116 It could be suggested
that Caillois seems to consider that play and games are linked and, hence, the
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unselective appearance of each term throughout crucial parts of the text while
establishing the critical defining points of the play concept. The terminology used to
enhance Huizinga’s definition in addition to Caillois’ expansion of the range of play,
results in the conflation of play and games, as identified by Carlson and confirmed
for myself. As a consequence, I’m unclear if play and games are separate
phenomena, or one in the same, for Caillois.

2.5 Sub-Conclusion of the Analytical Definitions of Play
Both Huizinga and Caillois provide a sturdy foundation to begin scrutiny of game
and sport by underscoring their close relationship with play. Despite the strength
on their respective accounts of play, neither seeks to explicitly define the essence of
game or its relation. However I believe some characteristics of their definitions
require retooling if we are to view play as a meaningful concept. The definitions, as
presented by both Huizinga and Caillois, fail to convey why play is a sacred space
requiring a shielding force from what seems to be the inescapable encroachment of
ordinary means-ended behavior. Both dedicate significant attention to what seems
like the inevitable; however, they fail to specifically explicate why or what meaning
comes from playing, which in this specific instance applies to sport. I will answer
this important objection I have to the works of both of these early play theorists
throughout the next chapter.
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Chapter 3: A New Perspective
3.1 Going from the Analytical to the Existential
The most salient characteristic put forth by both Huizinga and Caillois is the relative
insignificance of play. Huizinga claims play cannot produce external good, while
Caillois considers it to be unproductive or pure waste. Callois’ outlook requires
immediate attention as it proves more troubling, since it maintains the position that
play has no utility whatsoever and is pure waste. By this statement one could
determine, ipso facto, that play carries no meaning when regarded in that way.
Such thinking completely trivializes one’s efforts during play activity, essentially
reducing it to mean nothing subsequent to the disintegration of the magic circle. My
contention early on in the introduction, claims that this is simply not true, and for
Caillois to characterize play in this way is very disconcerting. For Caillois to even
utilize a tiny fraction of means-ended thought to influence his perspective brings us
to an impasse that perfectly encapsulates the maddening absurdity at the center of
the play concept. If we accept Caillois’ premise the question now quickly becomes,
why engage in any activity if no possible good i.e. utility can become of it? We know
sport can’t possibly be a complete waste of time or no one would engage in it over
ordinary activity; therefore, other factors beyond the benefit of means-ended
behavior must be operating here. For, to exist in the play world without any
possible benefit would be absurd, illogical, and truly devoid of meaning. Huizinga
and Caillois are both important for their early exploration of the play concept and
their respective definitions, but it is my assertion that the best way to understand

52
the meaning of play is to shift from that of analytical formalism to existentialism. I
will attempt to prove that play contains existential meaning by viewing the player
through the lens of an analogous paradoxical absurdity in the myth of Sisyphus.117

3.2 The Myth of Sisyphus
Albert Camus is one of the philosophers best known for elevating the philosophic
movement of ‘absurdism.’ Camus’ well-known book, The Myth of Sisyphus, attempts
to assist humanity in the search for meaning within an absurd world without
universal truths or values. The bulk of Camus’ text is unrelated to my purpose as he
primarily focuses upon the question of suicide, once one is faced with realization of
the absurd. Where Camus’ text becomes useful for the purpose at hand, is his final
chapter, in which he highlights the myth of the text’s namesake that parallels nicely
with ‘the player.’ We first encounter the myth of Sisyphus by way of the Homeric
hero Odysseus’ self-report of his return from the underworld Tartarus.118 Known
among the notorious sinners,119 Sisyphus was a trickster who deceived the gods by
shackling Thanatos in order to prevent humans from dying. The Olympian gods
freed Thanatos from bondage to restore the natural order, and punished Sisyphus
by banishing him to the underworld, only to escape Hades’ lair shortly thereafter
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upon using another cunning trick. After being forcibly returned to the underworld
by Hermes, Sisyphus is punished by Zeus for his incredible hubris.

3.3 The Absurd within the Play Paradox and the Absurd
Myth of Sisyphus
Randolph Feezell follows on the heels of Camus using the myth of Sisyphus, but this
time for its application to the paradox of playing sport. Feezell has produced a lot of
research in the field of philosophy of sport, primarily focusing on the metaphysical
aspect of sport and ‘the player’s’ thinking within such an arbitrary pursuit. The
utilization of the myth of Sisyphus presents a great contrast to the ideas presented
by Caillois according to Feezell’s analysis of how it relates to sport.120 Sisyphus is
condemned to the eternal drudgery of ceaselessly pushing a heavy stone to the top
of a hill, only to see it descend back down, where he must retrieve it and continue
his endless toil.121 However, it is never explicitly mentioned how Sisyphus
withstands his punishment in the underworld, only leaving us to imagine how he
endures while directly confronting his absurd fate. Sisyphus exists in all eternity as
proletarian of the gods, powerless in the present and future, due the rebellious
nature of his past.122 Each time Sisyphus makes his descent down his hill it provides
him a full appreciation of the extent of his wretched condition.123 Camus asserts
that it is during that descent to the base of the hill that Sisyphus becomes most
120
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interesting and becomes curious.124 Sisyphus parallels nicely with the player due to
the shared pointlessness in which their tasks are grounded.
Feezell underscores the connection between Sisyphus and homo ludens
through the following analogy, “What is absurd, perhaps, is the incongruity between
human purposiveness and necessary frustration.”125 Sisyphus’ plight is as one
whose entire being is exerted towards the accomplishment of nothing, at least in
terms of progression, because his task is circular. In order for Feezell to find
meaning within what appears to be sport’s insignificance, the question he faces
when invoking Sisyphus, which he doesn’t explicitly ask, takes the following form:
“Are the player and Sisyphus kindred spirits, and if not, what is difference between
them”? This answer possibly holds the key to unlocking fruits of play’s existential
meaning, while consequently supporting my earlier objection to Caillois’ proposition
of play being unavailing or a complete waste. This will be achieved by distilling the
meaning of the play concept against what appears to be the epitome of
meaninglessness in Sisyphus.

3.4 Finding Play’s Meaning Through a Contrast with
Sisyphean Absurdity
Let us reflect back to Huizinga who doesn’t preclude the possibility of value in the
play activity, but suggests such value cannot be linked to the ordinary world beyond
the magic circle. Caillois leaves himself drastically smaller space in which his
124
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definition may operate, since he considered play unproductive and a complete
waste. Feezell, and I, would agree that Sisyphus’ drudgery compares nicely to
Caillois’ characteristic of play because nothing practical becomes of his labor beyond
further repetition of the same useless task.126 The problem here lies in Caillois’
outlook that measures play according to practicality of homo faber. Perhaps it is not
unreasonable to suggest play begins similarly to the drudgery of Sisyphus for the
player, since they complete an unimportant goal relative to the context of quotidian
life. However, I am of the opinion that it would be a mistake to liken the absurdity of
play to being truly identical to the absurdity of Sisyphus’ labour. Although, it is
important to point out this comparison provides us better insight in understanding
that meaning drawn from life, stems only from the intrinsic.
It should be reiterated that Sisyphus’ labor is a punishment that is
involuntary, which poses a stark contrast to the voluntary conduct of the player who
freely engages in play according to the definitions of both Huizinga and Caillois. Play
is never constrained or forced, or else the activity wouldn’t be play.127 Sisyphus has
been stripped of the freedom to choose the unserious activity in which play is
rooted, rooted for its own sake. I believe the compulsory nature of his activities in
the myth represents the nadir of Sisyphus’ life. The humiliation felt by Sisyphus
stems from the stripping of his autonomy and self-determination of how he brings
purpose and fulfillment to his own life. Instead Zeus the supreme Olympian god
imposed a punishment on Sisyphus that was essentially the same as fellow
notorious sinner Prometheus, who is to be bound to a rock suffering passively for all
126
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eternity.128 Only, Sisyphus is fettered to his rock, but his sentence is crueler because
it actively robs him of choice in determining how he is to fulfill his existence as he is
forced to complete the same task for all eternity. Yet his task serves as constant
reminder of the potential of his existence that will be forever wasted in vacuous
drudgery. While Zeus has stripped Sisyphus of complete autonomy, he punishes
him with this useless task because normal punishment typically serves some sort of
greater utility, where usefulness in itself contains some inherent meaning. Zeus
designed the punishment for the exact purpose of robbing Sisyphus of any
significance he would have enjoyed as result of all his deception as a trickster prior
to his arrival to Tartarus.129 The irony at the center of Sisyphus’ predicament for the
Olympian gods rests in the fact that such an incredible task, completed repetitively,
would cease to bear any meaning when done for all eternity. Although the
punishment has been externally imposed upon Sisyphus, he continues in perpetuity
with no explicit mention of any externally applied pressure beyond that of the
original command of Zeus. However, Sisyphus’ punishment does contribute
meaning to his life while at the base of the hill, when he has full appreciation of the
absurdity of his predicament. Sisyphus’ decision to return to his rock, to shoulder
his burden, suggests intrinsic meaning persists amidst the complete misery shaping
his existence as he begins his recurring decent from the summit. It is this assertion
of the significance of the little enduring intrinsic meaning within Sisyphus that leads
Camus to his curious conclusion of the book. Camus suggests crushing truths cease
to pose a problem when they are acknowledge and opposed. He goes on to suggest
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that, “The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his
victory.”130 When one acknowledges terrible truths, one thereby rises above them.
I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds
one’s burden again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that
negates the gods and raises rocks. He too concludes that all is well.
This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither
sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that
night filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself
toward the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart. One must imagine
Sisyphus happy.131

Play has similarities to the form of Sisyphus’ punishment with respect to the
insignificance of the task undertaken; however, both contain intrinsic meaning for
most individuals involved. Most sport games that are played are dedicated to
accomplishing what is a rather monotonous task, only in an extraordinary way!
Consider the parallel of the marathoner or long distance swimmer with Sisyphus.
There is no reason for them to traverse a road course or body of water with the
advent of automobile and nautical transportation. There actions are on par with the
level of uselessness of those of Sisyphus, but their reasons for engaging in such
conduct differ completely. Therefore, I posit that playing in the realm of sport is
simply a heightened sense of intrinsic meaning to the player, due to the imaginative
component that is the distinguishing factor between the two endeavors. However,
the important concept of volition is critical in the juxtaposition of Sisyphus’
drudgery with the amusement of the player. One primary difference between the
two absurdities rests in the fact Sisyphus’ labor is interminable, while the player’s
‘play’ is not. When a player voluntarily engages in a game he or she does so while
130
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observing the rules designed to bring about some end or final goal due to the
meaningfulness of choosing that pursuit. I am suggesting that playful activities take
on a clear meaning by virtue of choosing the very rule system internal to a specific
play sphere. Therefore, obvious intrinsic meaning results from the players’ deep
vested personal interests in that particular form of ‘play’ and the way they embrace
their embodiment accordingly.
Coupled with the concept of choice, is the fact of play’s temporary nature,
which is wholly different from Sisyphus’ toil. Feezell also points out that the
decision to choose the rules that generate Huizinga’s concept of the magic circle
presents a critical structural element to play that Sisyphus’ toil doesn’t have,
namely, a conclusion. Play activities are purposive insofar as they are oriented
toward the ends internal to the play world, and they lead toward a
consummation.132 In the world of Sisyphus there can be no consummation because
there is no final end to his toil. This teleological aspect of play gives meaning to the
activities that lead toward a specific end in view, or a cloudy indeterminate one. The
fact that an end exists is another fundamental difference between homo ludens and
Sisyphus, because without it consummation is impossible.133 Play, according to
Feezell, especially when occurring in the form of the contest, is a quest with
purpose, ending in fulfillment of Caillois’ ludic prescriptions.134 Thus, being able to
freely exist, and choose how you arrive at the desired end one seeks, is central to the
heightened intrinsic value of play. Although, I agree with the suggestion that ‘play’ is
132
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considered absurd, it must not be thought so by virtue of an exact analogy with the
absurdity of Sisyphus’ plight.135 Absurdity in the ‘play’ form contains heightened
meaning for the individual. While it is also true that intrinsic value is not a concept
completely lost onto Sisyphus; therefore he still experiences such value in the face of
the absurd when he returns to his task. It is in this point where Feezell and I begin
to diverge. Feezell believes absurdity doesn’t translate to meaningless within play, a
premise to which I agree. However, he sees no intrinsic value within Sisyphus’
toil.136 Therefore, Feezell views the analogy as an inexact parallel of sorts, where I
view it as especially apt from the standpoint distinguishing the heightened intrinsic
meaning of play amidst the absurdity of a unique concept in sport.
Richard Taylor, another prominent philosopher who dealt with the question
of the meaning of life using the myth of Sisyphus, would certainly agree with
Feezell’s point regarding an activity’s culmination. Consider Taylor’s remark from
Good and Evil,
Meaninglessness is essentially endless pointlessness, and
meaningfulness is therefore the opposite. Activity, and even long,
protracted, repetitive activity has a meaning if it has some
culmination, some more or less lasting end that can be considered to
have been the direction and purpose of the activity.137

This passage becomes clearer when considering play, according to Caillois’
play continuum, as activities progress toward the Ludus end of the spectrum. The
following expressions capture the difference between homo ludens and Sisyphus
perfectly: “just finish the race,” “giving a competitor one’s best effort,” or “leaving it
135
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all out on the field for your teammates.” Such statements possess a decided element
of finality, indicating the momentary nature of sport, due to existence of choice and
freedom within play, with which, both Taylor and Feezell would agree. Along with
this sense of finality, I believe we gain a productive element, at least intrinsically. If
the decision to play stems from an intrinsic choice, play need not serve any external
or tangible appetite according to our earlier definitions.138 It becomes rewarding
emotionally, psychologically, and spiritually because it is the ultimate expression of
freedom to direct one’s will towards self-actualization in the form believed to carry
the most meaning for the individual.
Ultimately, we must return our focus to Caillois and the claim suggesting play
is unproductive. Play throughout the entire range of Caillois’ spectrum contains
intrinsic good available simply by undertaking the playful activity. However, Caillois
correctly points out, playful activity exists on a continuum because the nature of the
play experience resonates quite differently between individuals and, hence, the
slight difference of the activity in our introductory example of Suzy (tee-ball) and
Ken Griffey (MLB), despite what may be similar intrinsic motivation felt by each.
This is why play cannot be considered a single homogenous thing that Huizinga
proposed.139 I believe there are similarities between hide-and-go seek, playing tag,
playing catch, baseball, rowing, and even gladiatorial combat, but the experience of
playing each of them is not completely identical. Each game possesses a distinct
combination of game elements previously described by Caillois, which shape the
player’s unique playing experience. Certain values inherent within each activity
138
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resonate with a person’s particular stage of development, interests, experiences that
contribute to a very meaningful mode of achieving self-actualization defined by the
individual’s free choice and the teleological nature of the activity. Each stage of
growth as result of this transformative experience, in itself, demonstrates the value
of play. Such personal value is of a different sort than what I suspect Caillois
intended in his definition by using the word “useless.” Nonetheless, I believe I have
established that a element unique to the individual is central to the play concept
within the heart of every person truly ‘playing’ sports.
Using the work of Feezell and Taylor, it has been established that a
connection between freedom of choice and intrinsic significance lies at the heart
play’s meaning. The analogy between homo ludens and Sisyphus is once again
tremendously helpful for evaluating the significance of play stemming from the
original characteristics outlined by Huizinga and Caillois. Homo ludens and Sisyphus
approach their respective activities from oddly similar perspectives within their
own hearts. Homo ludens chooses to freely engage in play when accomplishing
something rather insignificant, while Sisyphus continually perseveres while
essentially bound to his rock. Sisyphus lives a completely inconsequential existence
for all eternity, undertaking what is thought to be an intrinsically meaningless task,
but is truly extrinsically meaningless. However, it should be pointed out that
although he did not choose to be condemned to such a miserable existence, he
invests himself in shouldering his burden like the player does his task. The outlook
each carries toward his task is of the utmost importance, for suppose that Sisyphus
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wanted to do what he is, in fact, doomed forever to do by necessity.140 Sisyphus’
task would be pleasurable as oppose to baneful because his task would match his
desires. However, the purpose of his task bears meaning only through fulfilling it as
a form of punishment. Sisyphus realizes the absurdity, but escapes its hold.
Although he is not able to freely choose, he continually approaches his rock with
effort and resolve knowing it contributes to his eternal torment, which certifies him
as the absurd hero.141 Camus ultimately uses the myth of Sisyphus to imply that the
only meaning that can be drawn from our lives is of the intrinsic variety, since
extrinsic meaning can’t be gained while immersed in an absurd pursuit e.g. sports.
Camus’ example of suicide, and also what I would describe as a general
unwillingness to accept the absurdity of one’s circumstance, disagrees with the
characteristics of the ideal player.
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Chapter 4: Balancing Both Sides of the Player
4.1 The Absurdity of Homo Ludens
What makes Sisyphus the archetype of the absurd life is the gap between his desires
and the reality of his activity; he is burdened with attitudes inconsistent with his
situation.142 It is difficult for Feezell to conceive of something objectively absurd,
because the absurd seems to be a function of wills, desires, and interests.143 The
player’s intrinsic purpose changes his understanding as he enters the play sphere,
allowing him to incorporate a serious attitude to the trivial. Therefore, his play
seems wholly contradictory to the endless drudgery of Sisyphus from the standpoint
of attitude, despite carrying out a nearly identical task with respect to means-ended
significance. Yet, this difference exposes the fundamental tension between the
player’s serious attitude and the reality of the true insignificance of playfulness in
the ordinary world for Feezell. Feezell highlights the dynamic between two
inconsistent attitudes that define the play sphere. “Unlike Sisyphus, the player
regards his activity as if it were truly significant, but, like Sisyphus, the player really
does come up empty handed.”144 Nothing tangible comes of play, and the player
only consciously recognizes that play is really unserious subsequent to the
dissolution of the magic circle. When in play the player momentarily transcends
quotidian life to enter Huizinga’s consecrated magic circle, which has its own
meanings and prescriptions. The freedom of play suggests that we voluntarily
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bracket our ordinary and pressing concerns as we take a stance outside the practical
affairs of life.145 Recall one of Huizinga’s essential characteristics of play:
Play is not ordinary or real life. It is rather a stepping out of real life
into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all its own. The
essence of play comes into existence through a decision to play. Such
a constitutive decision cannot be compelled and is essentially free.
Through it arises the suspension of the ordinary concerns of the
everyday world. Such a decision does not simply initiate the playing
but rather constitutes it.”146

Thus according to Feezell, one might see the positive aspect of play as
transcendence of worldly constraint in the free projection of alternative
possibilities.147 This separation from the ordinary lends a peculiar flavor to play, for
it is a withdrawal from those things normally associated with the seriousness of life.
Like the make-believe play of children, there arises a sense of unreality associated
with the play world. This make-believe aspect betrays a consciousness of the
inferiority of play compared with the seriousness, a feeling that seems to be
something as primary as play itself.148 Although homo ludens is charged with tasks
seemingly insignificant, the attitude of homo ludens presents a curious paradox.149
Homo ludens’ behavior is not in keeping with a frivolous attitude typically expected
of one when completing such an impractical task. Homo ludens’ actions within the
magic circle point to the contrary; therefore, play is undertaken with utmost
seriousness, with an absorption, a devotion that passes into rapture and,
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temporarily at least, completely abolishes that troublesome temporary feeling.150 A
certain abandon goes along with the freedom to play. So we arrive at a curious
dialectic within the experience of play, between the idea of it being unserious, yet
also simultaneously profoundly serious. We play our games with abandon and
intensity as if nothing in this challenge mattered more than making the basket,
winning the game, or overcoming a challenge.
When the attitude of homo ludens is contrasted with the means-ended human
nature outlined in the introduction, one can gain a better appreciation of the
absurdity at the center of ‘play’. Recall Feezell’s account of the absurd in the
instance of ‘play’ as:
A conspicuous discrepancy between pretension or aspiration and
reality. The player must at one and the same time embrace the
seemingly contradictory attitudes that their play world is a fiction,
their commitment to the arbitrary rules of the game is gratuitous;
yet they must play as if it really mattered, because their decision to
play necessitates such commitment. Without commitment, he really
isn’t playing, but with commitment, the play sphere becomes the
solitary focus of the player despite its trivial purpose overall. In the
form of the play contest, the absence of commitment descends the
game into mere frolic completely killing the framework designed to
bring about aim to the activity. Thomas Nagel stated the following
about the absurdity of life as a whole, “We always have available a
point of view outside the particular form of our lives, from which the
seriousness appears gratuitous.” This situation is precisely seen in
play, because of the bracketing of the ordinary and the creation of a
play sphere with its own internal aspects of time, and space. The
always available point of view outside the play world is, of course,
the standpoint of the ordinary world that generates the criteria for
what we take as really serious. Whenever we say “it’s only a game”
we acknowledge this ability to detach ourselves from the immediate
participation in play, yet this doesn’t mean that we will not play
seriously, just as the recognition of the absurd doesn’t mean that we
will henceforth fail to take anything in life seriously. Therefore, to
150
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speak of play as absurd describes this structure or dialectic. The
absurdity of play describes the incongruous collision between the
single-minded aspiration of the player and nature of play that
undermines the seriousness of the pursuit. Regardless of whether
Nagel is right about life as a whole, the absurdity involved in game
playing is apparent through the player’s mediation of two
antithetical truisms that comprise the duality of spirited play.151

4.2 Playful Irony
Feezell’s passage requires us to revisit Huizinga and Caillois from the standpoint of
Thomas Nagel’s well-known concept the “view from nowhere.” Nagel highlights that
humans have the capability of thinking about the world from a standpoint that
transcends personal experience. It is this particular perspective Nagel describes as
the “view from nowhere.”152 Simultaneously, each person carries his or her own
deeply personal views about the world that contribute to his or her own
understanding of the world, but don’t constitute it. How we reconcile these
divergent perceptions is fundamental to progressing to a more nuanced
understanding of the ‘play’ concept. Nagel’s concept allows us to build upon
analysis of earlier play theorists. Huizinga’s previous assertion that sports are nonseriousness is an incomplete truth. A literal understanding of Huizinga’s point is
simple-minded and fails to truly represent the complexity or depth of play. Homo
ludens must temper his deep subjective interests and passions with a conflicting
sense of objectivity and frivol. One can find further clarity within the ‘play’ concept
when considering the dualistic attitude central to ‘play.’ I believe it is important to
151
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point out that Huizinga didn’t mean ‘play’ completely lacks seriousness, otherwise
he would have used the strongest possible prefix ‘not.’ While Huizinga
demonstrates considerable foresight in this capacity, Caillois seems to stumble into
a conceptual rut through the indirect comparison with homo faber. Characterizing
‘play’ as unproductive, or a waste, also implies that it is tantamount to a completely
useless means-ended pursuit, or not being a serious endeavour whatsoever within
the grand scheme of things. ‘Play’ is not means-ended because Huizinga clearly
established that ‘play’ is self-serving. Therefore, the interpretation of Caillois’ point
on the unproductivity of play suggests his evaluation of ‘play’ fails to appreciate the
duality of the ‘play’ concept. The contention that ‘play’ is not serious would seem to
demonstrate Caillois’ failure to understand the ontological nature of ‘play’ itself.
Feezell notes that there is something deeply ironic about the attitude of the
player.153 Within structured sport approaching the Ludus range of Caillois’
spectrum, the player must attempt to balance the serious aspirations and reality in
an especially precarious way. Feezell uses Nagel’s concept of “the view from
nowhere” to explain ‘play’s’ tricky duality. He cites the trouble with play and
seriousness is determining, “How to combine the perspective of a particular person
inside the world with an objective view of the same world, the person and the
viewpoint included.”154 The play sphere is created and maintained by a set of
internal prescriptions dictating the pursuit of an ultimate aim. Players, more often
than not, lose themselves and their focus on the importance of the ordinary world
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beyond the ‘play’ sphere, especially during the crucial points of a contest when
athletic drama is unfolding.155 The situation described above represents a deeply
subjective one, based on understanding of the world normally present within the
“poor sport.” The flaw inherent to poor sports is that their subjective experience in
the play sphere seems completely isolated from the effects of an objective
viewpoint, which is particularly glaring upon the recognition of play’s triviality. This
is similarly viewed upon as absurd because it represents, “The collision between the
seriousness with which we take our lives and the perpetual possibility of regarding
everything about which we are serious as arbitrary, or open to doubt.”156 Therefore,
we must accord playful activity the requisite seriousness in order to maintain its
possibility, while also demonstrating awareness of the ordinary which envelopes
the temporary ‘play’ sphere. To become too serious about play would negate the
trivial nature of the situation, while an utter lack of sincerity in the activity,
eliminates its possibility.
To this point Feezell has established the absurdity of ‘play’. He also provides
another important but overlooked characteristic of play, by way of Nagel. The ‘play’
of homo ludens is both trivial and absurd when considering Nagel’s concept of ‘the
view from nowhere.’ The player must appreciate the trivial and absurd for what
they are, characteristics sine qua non to the play spirit. Recognition of this unique
perspective is a precondition to the constitution of the player and transforms the
ontological nature of the activity from work to ‘play.’ Therefore, the ideal player
participates while guided by the spirit of ‘play.’ This state exists in the kind of
155
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golden mean used by Aristotle to determine virtue between two extreme character
traits.157 In the case of play, a precarious balance must be achieved between the
excesses of seriousness, and frivolousness, for the player to the have a sense of the
play spirit.158 The right combination of means-ended purpose, tempered by
frivolity, allows both characteristics to coalesce and form the athletic ironist.159
Playing ironically can be best described as:
An awareness of the paradoxical nature of an activity as competitive
play in the form of serious nonseriousness, or nonserious
seriousness. Irony is an attitude that embraces the basic incongruity
of our devotions to triviality, our celebration of absurdity every time
we compete intensely and play games seriously.160
Our contemporary understanding of play is not so nuanced, nor does it seem
to have any sort of dynamic structure. Playing sport, contemporarily, is best
understood from the excessive end of one character trait. There is a gross
oversimplification of the fluidity of the ‘play’ experience, and we have seemingly
limited the range of possible emotions to be experienced by approaching ‘play’ with
such a parochial scope. This is best understood as a ‘play’ paradigm that exists
through our society’s common maxims about ‘play’, which contribute to our ongoing
misunderstanding of sport. This is primarily due to capturing sport as a simplified
concept and negating its nuanced nature within the following examples by Feezell.
Consider the ironic stance of the player in the famous Vince
Lombardi remark, “Winning is not the most important thing: it’s the
only thing.” Yet conversely there is another famous truism, “It’s not
whether you win or lose, but how you play the game,” as if play was
merely the instrument of moral education. Finally, it would also
157
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abuse the irony of the play attitude to emphasize entirely the
intrinsic value of play to the exclusion of a serious pursuit of an end,
“It’s not whether you win or lose, but that you play the game.” All of
these are only partial truths that overemphasize one side of the
dialectic. Play is serious, but unreal. You must have it both ways
otherwise it ceases to be play.161

4.3 Contrasting the Absurd with the Analytical Formalist
Account of Play
I believe the idea that led Feezell to the concept of ‘playful irony,’ serves as an
excellent basis to further refine the accounts of Huizinga and Caillois. Needless to
say, Huizinga was essentially correct as his non-serious characteristic acknowledges
the middle ground existing between ordinary seriousness and frivolousness in
different, but similar, terms. While I should point out that the more nuanced
account of play suggests Caillois was wrong to claim that play is an utter waste. The
implication of such meaninglessness fails to recognize the duality previously
explained. In being fair, by putting Caillois’ remark within the proper context of
defending humanity’s right to play; his observation certainly isn’t meant
pejoratively. However, it seriously fails to represent play as something beyond
diversion, quite possibly the ultimate sense of perspective toward life. Esteemed
writer, philosopher, and theologian, Michael Novack shares an opinion that I
support, that playing sports carries significance extending beyond that of a
capricious diversion. Similar to Meier’s beliefs on play, Novack suggests a stark
contrast between means-ended and playful behavior that shapes one’s outlook.
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Play, not work, is the end of life. To participate in the rites of
play is to dwell in the Kingdom of Ends. To participate in work,
career, and the making of history is to labor in the Kingdom of
Means. The modern age, the age of history, nourishes illusions. In a
protestant culture, as in Marxist cultures, work is serious, important,
and adult. Its essential significance is overlooked. Work, of course,
must be done, but we should be wise enough to distinguish necessity
from reality. Play is reality, work is diversion and escape.162

My final objection towards these earlier accounts of the ‘play’ concept
pertains to their proposed mutual exclusivity between play and material interests.
This problem poses greater difficulties with Caillois’ proposal of the ‘play’ spectrum
than it does Huizinga. Caillois effectively reasons that games of chance exist, but
external goods aren’t produced by the activity but, rather, only redistributed. Thus,
helping to maintain the separation of goods as originally conceived by Huizinga.
Creating a binary utilizing external reward as a criterion to differentiate between
play and non-play generates troubling logical inconsistencies. If a characteristic of
play indeed dictates that no wealth or good can be created, this would now make the
distinction between professional and amateur irreconcilable. Caillois asserts, “As
for professional it is clear that they are not players but workers. When they ‘play,’ it
is at some other game.”163 When considering this problem the question becomes
whether an external element, such as extrinsic reward for participants,
fundamentally changes the nature of the activity from something resembling play
towards something that should be considered work? The most salient difference
between the professional and sincere player is the external motivation driving
participation. Participating under these conditions transforms ‘play,’ turning what
162
163

Michael Novak. The Joy of Sport (Basic Books: New York, 1976), p. 40
Caillois, p. 6

72
was once an escape, into obligation, guided by compulsion.164 Caillois doesn’t seem
to harbor as much inherent cynicism towards the professional as he considers sport
to retain most of its isolated, regulated, and formal characteristics when players are
paid.165 As we can see, in the case of Caillois, framing the debate of sport’s moral
fiber around the question of professionalism and amateurism is misguided and
leads to logical problems when reflected upon with the understanding of sport’s
metaphysical nature.
Huizinga and Caillois both seem to believe that external motivation can
override the intrinsic nature of ‘play’ and, hence, the mutual exclusivity both ascribe
to their own definition of ‘play.’ This is not necessarily true, as seen in the case of
“flow” studied by Czikszentmihalyi.166 Flow is thought to be the perfect harmony
between the player and the ‘play’ sphere when such a player singularly focuses upon
the ultimate aim of the play activity.167 The player truly enters the suspended time
and space of the magic circle, unaware and completely detached from the realities of
the ordinary. Flow is a state within the ‘play’ experience unmatched that we all
strive toward, but seldom achieve. Nonetheless, it can be achieved at any level of
sport, ranging from the professional to simple forms. An activity that makes the
flow experience possible must be challenging, and the level of the game required to
create the flow experience will improve as the player becomes more and more
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skilled.168 The difference between the professional and amateur is the external
consequence of participation, not the quality of the ‘play’ experience. The idea of
flow seems to debunk the idea of separation of external goods from the magic circle,
because there are countless examples of professionals in ‘flow.’ I contend that these
professionals are locked into a performance and not ‘play.’ By completing such
skillful activity one can be experiencing something similar to flow when locked into
the challenge of the tasks. They are not ‘playing’ but just achieving in goal-oriented
form. In some ways flow represents the pinnacle of ‘play.’ If this is the case, it
becomes extremely difficult to distinguish between the goals of the professional and
amateur within the magic circle.
Despite the fact that flow is the pinnacle play experience shared by
professionals and sincere players at their apex; the drastic shift in mindset towards
means-ended conduct presents the fundamental problem. Something that was
previously done for pleasure as an escape can become an obsession and
obligation.169 This shift in mindset towards means-ended conduct occurs when the
universe of play is infringed upon by the real world. Essentially, assigning real
consequences to trivial and playful acts, which results in the corruption of ‘play.’
The player is truly practicing a profession where they may experience flow. The
existence of external goods don’t change the game, or the magic circle, for those
involved; they fundamentally changes the player’s attitude to the point that he no
longer plays but practices a profession. This is due to the omnidirectional meansended approach infiltrating the consecrated space dedicated to the former players’
168
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free pursuit of the play activity. Without the free inconsequential nature of the
activity there exists, an extreme compulsion to win because the means-ended
approach dictates such a singular pursuit. As we will come to find out in the next
chapter, such a compulsion is wholly incompatible with the tenets of these early
forms of ‘play’.
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Chapter 5 Interrelationship of the Trio
5.1 Relationship of Play and Game
Defining the nature of play and its relationship within the ‘tricky triad’ represents
the initial step in clarifying the process of drawing meaning from ‘playing’ sport.
After Huizinga and Caillois produced workable definitions of what constitutes ‘play,’
it became important to consider the configurations that facilitate and foster ‘play,’
Caillois quickly touched upon the common example of games in his four-category
typology outlined in Man, Play and Games. However, Caillois doesn’t provide an
account of the essence of ‘games’ like he does for the nature of play, where he
specifically outlines the characteristics that delimit ‘play.’ Consequently, we are able
to identify who can be involved in ‘play’, what its constitution is, when it occurs, and
where it takes place. Games don’t appear to follow the same model of necessary and
sufficient conditions upon first glance. The category of ‘game’ contains a great deal
of variability on the surface. Oftentimes Caillois’ games seem completely dissimilar
when contrasted to other games that fit within the broader ‘game’ category. For
instance, Chinese checkers and Bocce ball are both considered games, but they
vastly differ outside of the competitive structure that provide purpose to the
concept of a ‘game.’ The competitive nature of both games appears to be the shared
structural characteristic between ‘game’ and ‘sport.’ It seems quite possible that
‘game’ and ‘sport’ share the same necessary and sufficient conditions; however,
‘game’ encompasses a broader scope while ‘sport’ is more narrowly defined.
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The concept of ‘play’ represents the most extensive range of possibility;
therefore, it can be observed in most instances and appears to be common to both
sports and games. Games are the logical choice to continue this paradigm because
they encompass a greater range of possible examples, whereas, what could be
considered sport is quite limited, even with the most liberal of sporting opinions.
This sort of understanding differentiates the three concepts on a sort of continuum.
In the context of mapping this relationship, the position of sport and games is
determined simply by how often each concept can be recognized as part of human
activity. ‘Play’ is completely different from games and sports because ‘play’ arises
spontaneously and is not a constructed system unlike ‘game’ and ‘sport,’ that are
contrived to bring about a type of play identified by Caillois. Therefore, we must
clarify whether ‘game’ and ‘sport’ are concepts related by core similarities in their
constitution, but distinguished by particular surface details; or, are they progressive
variations emerging from the genus of ‘play’ to more specialized and distinct
categories. Meier, at first, suggests the three exist on a continuum transitioning in
the order of Play-Games-Sport.170 Without a precise definition of the essence of
sports and games, the question of what true ‘play’ is within ‘sport’ cannot be
answered. The answer to this question of definition and the exact relationship with
play is examined in Bernard Suits’ book The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia as
a response of sorts to the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations. Suits’ definition brings ‘game’ into the light, further away from what
he sees as the amorphous understanding of Wittgenstein, demonstrating its
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undeniable connection to foundational play characteristics. However, Suits
proposes his own refinements to the play definition. From this perspective we can
begin to more accurately identify what games are and their place in the tricky triad.
From Suits’ position on play and games we can better analyze and produce a
definition of playing sport amongst sport philosophers.

5.2 Forming a Revised Definition of Play
It is Suits’ belief that Huizinga was essentially correct when he formulated the first
definition of play. However, Suits attempts to strengthen the play definition by
adding the qualification of ‘autotelicity,’ and delimiting it to the specific instances of
‘play’ in order to truly have a working concept of it.171 Suits explained the nature of
autotelicty existed entirely with the process not output. “Autotelic activities are
activities which are ends in themselves.”172 Autotelicity is simply a greater standard
for the separation of the ‘play’ environment from the surrounding ordinary. These
practices are done simply because they are good in themselves and serve no other
end but themselves. Suits suggests that all instances of ‘play’ are instances of
autotelic activity.173 However, he views autotelicity as a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition, for an adequate definition of ‘play.’174 Ultimately, Suits must
conclude that ‘play’ and ‘game’ are logically distinct because of the separate
definitions he has created for both concepts. The commonly held view of ‘game’ as a
171
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species of ‘play’ is incorrect. Play is its own concept that certainly influences ‘games’
in a capacity, but it is important to understand that it is distinct from ‘game’ and
‘sport.’
When we use the word ‘play’ we don’t always limit it to its proper context
and far too often attribute it to other concepts, which adds to the heightened
confusion of the term. For example, Suits outlines that we commonly use the word
play as an infinitive to describe things like performing with a violin, and operating a
pinball machine.175 The cross application of the word is unique because we don’t
lose any parts of the original meaning when used outside of it proper context.176
This similarly applies to participation and playing a game. The existence of the
expression ‘playing a game’ is not by itself a compelling reason for insisting that
there is logical relation between playing and game-playing.177
Consider Suits’ example of Johnny and his conduct while eating dinner.178 It
wouldn’t be out of the ordinary to hear Johnny’s mom instruct him to stop playing
with his mashed potatoes. Describing Johnny’s conduct as ‘play’ is completely
within reason. However, defining it as game-play or a game while sitting in for
family dinner seems nonsensical.179 Without the elements of game Suits had
originally outlined, Johnny’s playful conduct doesn’t meet criteria of ‘game.’ It could
only be described as a primitive realm of ‘play.’ Conversely, in the opposite situation
of a game, it appears implausible for everyone to be truly playing. When Huizinga
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mentions the rise of the professional who plays sports for pay, we are not all
inclined to conclude from that fact, that they are without qualification, playing.180
Thomas Hurka, utilizes Suits’ theory to conclude that being involved in a game
doesn’t constitute ‘playing.’ One simply must follow the rules to remain within the
limits of the game in order to game-play. They need not accept rules for their own
sake, just simply to make the activity possible.181 Hence, when contrasting the
professional athletes participation in sport alongside more innocent activities like
playing with their own kids, only the latter seems to truly represent ‘play.’ The
distinction here is best understood when the two are contrasted; therefore, Suits
describes play and game-play as dependently identifiable.182
Suits supports his assertion of logical independence by suggesting,
The word play is used to designate the kind of thing Johnny does
with his mashed potatoes when he is not getting down to the serious
business of eating them, what is being designated is the kind of thing
that is inherently relative to something else, but that game, when it is
used to refer to such things as chess and basketball, is not.183
Play is understood primarily through comparisons with its opposite, seriousness,
while ‘game’ doesn’t appear to have an opposite counterpart. If we reflect back to
Suits’ example of Johnny, it appears that play carries the implication that mashed
potatoes (in this instance) are involved in purposes foreign, to or inconsistent with,
the way they are being utilized.184 Following Johnny’s dinner fun, he can also engage
in play by going outside where he can do all sorts of amusing things. This play
180Suits,
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seems different because Johnny has no instruments, but one detail remains
unchanged. Johnny’s behavior is autotelic, or done simply for its own sake and not
any other. Play is concerned with the use of resources for which those resources
were not initially intended, where the original allocation was for instrumental
activities and now the new allocation is for autotelic activities.185 From this Suits
formulates a revised definition of play: “x is playing if and only if x has made a
temporary reallocation to autotelic activities of resources primarily committed to
instrumental purposes.”186
If we revisit the case of Johnny’s post dinner play time, it isn’t
immediately obvious what resource he is using by just frolicking in the yard. The
resource need not only be instrumental, but one resource is common to all things
and that is time.187 As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, humans have a
finite period of time, primarily used for the accomplishment of something
worthwhile to the civilization or bettering it in some capacity. The concept of time
is integral to play because means-ended pursuits are considered to be prioritized
over autotelic play. Play only seems reasonable when time exists in a surplus, which
is the case for kids, because they generally don’t do much that’s considered
constructive with the time they have. However, adults understand the preciousness
of time and the ridiculousness of wasting it and, hence, why excessive play can be
viewed as absurd upon reaching a certain age of one’s life. Therefore play is
dependent upon the context of time when it is pursued as outlined by Suits.
185
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There are conditions under which it is proper to call various kinds of
aesthetic enjoyment play: not however, merely because they are
intrinsically valued pursuits, but because of the conditions under
which such intrinsically valued activities are pursued. The
conditions must be such that the time used for such pursuits is
viewed in contrast to a situation in which that time ought to be used
for an activity which has a higher claim upon it.188

5.3 Wittgenstein versus Suits on Games
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is a book unrelated to sport philosophy,
but is significant because of his claims regarding the status of conceptual analysis of
language and semantics. Wittgenstein asserts that some concepts like games don’t
have the determinate characteristics or sharp edges that conceptual analysis
requires for arriving at a precise definition.189 Wittgenstein suggests you don’t need
necessary and sufficient conditions to discover the essence of games because they
are linked only by a looser set of family resemblances.190 In other words,
Wittgenstein argues against the idea of concrete definitions as it pertains to
language and semantics. In order to prove his thesis of non-essential conditions
correct, Wittgenstein provides an example in games that he believes to be in
agreement with his reasoning. Using the example of games Wittgenstein posits,
Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”. I mean
board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, and so on.
What is common to them all? Don’t say: There must be something
common, or they would not be called games but look and see
whether there is anything common to all. For if you look at them you
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will not see something that is common to all, but similarities,
relationships, and a whole series of them at that.191
Wittgenstein observes elements that exist within some games, but vanish
from others. The nature of ball games differs completely from the standpoint of
requisite skill in chess, yet both are considered to be among the same classification
in ‘game.’ Despite being more informal, tic-tac-toe requires some analytical skills
similar to chess but lacks any sort of physical coordination. Last, a simple game of
rock, paper, scissors doesn’t require physical skills or analytical skills; otherwise,
instead it is predicated entirely on luck. If one is correct in identifying all the
pursuits above as games, despite their disparate workings, they can rely on
Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘family resemblance.’ Instead of possessing a clear-cut
characteristic, ‘games’ have a network of overlapping similarities. Consider the
various resemblances between family members possessing distinct characteristics
that aren’t completely uniform, but possess enough similarity that they can be
grouped as a family.192 Therefore, surface elements like ‘playfulness’ and ‘contest’
create the definition according to Wittgenstein. Ultimately, games have the same
qualities and cannot be completely atomized.
Bernard Suits account of ‘game’ directly opposes Wittgenstein’s principal
argument in Philosophical Investigations. Suits posits a framework that attempts to
identify the necessary and sufficient conditions that comprise a game, the very thing
Wittgenstein pronounced as impossible. Wittgenstein only notes the surface
differences between games in his example without even wondering whether they
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may not be consistent with deeper commonality.193 In The Grasshopper Suits
constructs an ironclad argument proving the analysis of Wittgenstein incorrect,
while identifying the components that define a game’s structure and the nature of
‘game-play’ and playing games.
Suits begins The Grasshopper by underscoring the dichotomous relationship
between games and work. Within this distinction lies a difference in the attitude
with which one approaches the respective endeavour. Since work revolves around
practicality, the worker will endeavour to use the most efficient means possible to
complete the goal.194 Conversely, the means chosen by the player are not of similar
efficiency, but complete inefficiency.195 Suits uses the especially apt example of golf
to prove the idea of inefficiency in game. Ultimately, the goal is to get the golf ball in
the designated hole, but a practical worker would simply walk over and place the
ball in the hole to fulfill this task. 196 In contrast, we see that we employ truly
inefficient means when playing golf. We use a variety of clubs that are impractical
when compared with the former means of the worker. Compounding the
inefficiency of the means employed, is the fact that getting the ball in the hole
doesn’t constitute the entire goal of the activity.197 One must also use the least
number of strokes accomplishing this goal, as oppose to simply completing the task
quickest.198 Such a restriction requires calculated precision and forethought from
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the player, unlike the worker who uses efficiency to remove such an unnecessary
burden. The inefficient means become legislated through the rules governing the
activity making them paramount to the game’s structure. Suit’s asserts that value
exist in the process not output. “Rules in games thus seem to be in some sense
inseparable from ends, for to break a game rule is to render impossible the
attainment of an end.”199 Therefore, the completion of game activity cannot be
considered independent of the means used to arrive at that end. The mode one
chooses is equally, if not more, important then the end itself. Doing the task in the
inefficient manner prescribed creates the possibility of the activity, not just
completing the end task. In the example of billiards, one cannot begin
indiscriminately shooting balls at one’s own convenience. Although sinking the
billiard balls, resembles the task the player is charged with in a billiards game, it
can’t be classified as a true game of billiards. The inefficiency of dealing with
impediments and sinking the eight ball defines billiards. Without these elements, it
could still be a form of billiards, but not the true game as constituted, according to
Suits.
The definition of games isn’t solely comprised of the inefficiency constituted
by the rules. An additional aspect of motivation, to freely comply with the rules, is
just as important, if not more so than the proscriptions themselves according to
Suits. Suits proposes that the player obeys the rules just because such obedience is
a necessary condition for engaging in the activity; and such obedience allows the
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game to become possible.200 Citing the example of high jump, Suits explains that
high jumpers don’t employ any type of means to cross the barrier but choose to
restrict themselves to the method used to do so voluntarily.201 Suit’s views the value
of ‘playing’ games from the standpoint of the process. Their reason for accepting
such rules is just because they want to act within the limitations of the rules
imposed. They accept rules so that they can play a game, and they accept these rules
so that they can play this game.202 The rationale for following the rules doesn’t
derive from any sort of means-ended calculation, but is simply due to the fact that
they simply want to high jump. In being a high jumper one doesn’t restrict the
modes of efficiency for topping the bar for any greater moral importance, but just
because they simply want to high jump.203 With respect to morals, obedience to the
rules makes an action right, but in games it defines the action.204
The concept of inefficiency and obedience to the rules proposed construct
the inner workings of a game. The end sought in the form of the game cannot simply
be to win. There must be an end which is distinct from winning because it is the
restriction of means to this other end that makes winning possible, and also defines,
in any given game, what it means to win.205 In defining a game we shall therefore,
have to take into account these two ends and a third one as well. First, there is the
end, which consists simply in a certain state of affairs requiring resolution. Then,
when a restriction of means for attaining this end is made with the introduction of
200Suits,
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rules, we have a second end, winning. Finally, with the stipulation of what it means
to win, a third end emerges: the activity of trying to win - that is, playing the
game.206 It is important to point out that games don’t require us to operate
inefficiently in our pursuit of victory.207 However, they do require us to operate
inefficiently in trying to achieve that state of affairs, which counts as winning only
when it is accomplished according to the rules of the game.208 For the way in which
those rules function is to prohibit use of the most efficient means for achieving the
game’s state of affairs.
Suits’ abbreviated definition states, “To play a game is to engage in activity
directed toward bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means
permitted by rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favor of less efficient
means, and where such rules are accepted just because they make possible such
activity.”209

5.4 The Elements of Game
From this definition we get the elements of game for Suits. The four characteristics
identified by Suits directly refute Wittgenstein’s family resemblance thesis. Games
aren’t characterized by surface similarities, but in fact possess essential conditions
universal to all games. These four characteristics proposed by Suits give a precise
account of the structures forming games. Suits’ definition suggests games

206

Suits, The Grasshopper, p. 48
Ibid p. 48
208 Ibid p. 48
209 Ibid p. 49
207

87
universally contain a task to be achieved, means limited by inefficiency, and rules.
However, the final characteristic described as the play attitude is the uniting force
giving meaning to the absurd. Suits titles the four characteristics as lusory goal,
lusory means, constitutive rules, and lusory attitude.210
The lusory goal is the first element of Suit’s definition. It refers to the
specific state of affairs the player is engaged in. The player attempts to achieve the
lusory goal in order to complete the end sought within the activity. For example,
consider the game of basketball where the lusory goal requires the player’s team to
score more points than they give up in the allotted period. However, often sports
are more nuanced incorporating a series of smaller hurdles that culminate in the
lusory goal. Suits describes these hurdles as pre-lusory goals211 which helps to
clarify how we bring about a specific resolution to our state of affairs. To continue
with the basketball example, the pre-lusory goal would be scoring on the opponent’s
goal by putting the ball through the hoop in any of the three possible point amounts.
The pre-lusory goal must be fulfilled in a particularly inefficient way in order to
qualify as a game as asserted by Suits in The Grasshopper.
The lusory means are the specific manner outlined in which conduct by the
player is deemed permissible in achieving the pre-lusory goal.212 In basketball it
would be much easier to carry the ball directly to the hoop and climb a ladder so
that you may easily place the ball in the basket, but this opposes the notion of
inefficiency. In order to successfully win or play a game, a player must adhere to the
210
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means because the lusory goal can’t be achieved independent of the means allowed.
Otherwise, it ceases to be basketball because inefficient basketball acts such as
shooting, dribbling, and passing no longer exist. The completion of pre-lusory goals
cannot be considered independent of the lusory means used to arrive at the ultimate
lusory goal. The means you choose are equally, if not more important than the
lusory goal itself when ‘playing’ a game. Adhering to these means allows the game
to become possible, because it’s not the goal that defines the game, but the
commitment to doing the activity in the precise manner possible, while reaching
that goal, that constitutes a game.
The third element of a game is the rules. They exist in three possible forms
beginning with rules of skill, constitutive rules, and regulative rules.213 Rules of skill
are not critical to the game, but they do outline how one best goes about doing the
task in a widely-accepted manner. Constitutive rules refer to the essential rules like
court size, number of players, and equipment, forcing players to conform their
actions to be in accordance with the means. Regulative rules are a subset of
constitutive rules that essentially serve to proscribe certain undesirable behaviors
by carrying a fixed penalty, quite often adding a secondary tactical element beyond
the rules of skill. The rules form a constitution presupposing the players will adhere
to the lusory means, therefore limiting the method of going about achieving the
lusory goal. In basketball constitutive rules exist, therefore, to optimize the flow of
the game through the dimensions of the court, type, and an allotted number of fouls,
all in addition to the limitation of five players actively participating per squad.
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Secondary rules exist, like travelling and double dribble, meant to enforce the lusory
means that circumscribe the game.
Last, but certainly not least, in Suits’ theory on games, is the characteristic of
lusory attitude. Above all it’s the single most important concept in determining how
games relate to ‘play.’ With respect to the nature of games, people have an intuitive
understanding that the goal is the end to the game. However, they recognize a
crucial part of ‘game’ is embracing this roundabout method of achieving the goal,
which runs contrary to the means-ended approach. Using the basketball example
again, nothing really prevents the player from travelling with the ball, or using
unnatural means like climbing a ladder, to score field goals. Quite simply the player
embraces the unnecessary difficulty these impediments pose, and as a result, unique
skills form a way of overcoming these voluntary obstacles. The player has a
fundamentally different mentality than a person demonstrating practical judgment.
By participating with a lusory attitude, the three prior characteristics of Suits’
theory merge into playful activity, due to the player’s decision to do the activity for
itself. Play is directly attributed to the lusory attitude, which is the result of the
player’s having the perfect storm of self-delusion and frivolity from their
perspective. Such an undertaking couldn’t be play without these qualities.

5.5 Tricky Triad
The definition of a game proposed by Suits is a tremendous building block in the
tricky triad debate. Prior to Suits’ definition, Wittgenstein’s family resemblances
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thesis complicated the nature of our understanding of games. However, more
importantly, Suits’ Elements of Games eliminates any lingering ambiguity between
the relationship of ‘game’ and ‘play.’ Wittgenstein’s family resemblances proposal
complicates our understanding of how ‘play’ exactly relates to ‘game.’ This
statement furthers the possibility that ‘play’ and ‘game’ could be conjoined. One can
be described as ‘playing’ a ‘game,’ but this simply adapts the defined concept,
previously explored by Huizinga and Caillois as noun, to actively describing the verb
on how one properly goes about conducting oneself in a ‘game;’ not describing
essential qualities of ‘play.’ Suits’ complete definition of the elements of game
proves that games are structurally designed to create and promote the play
characteristics outlined by Huizinga and Caillois. Within a ‘game’ the player must
accept the lusory means and state of inefficiency, otherwise it becomes impossible
to discover enhanced intrinsic meaning associated with choosing to perform the
activity that way. What is being done can’t be considered ‘play’, but an impractical
goal oriented endeavor. It is important to note here that the relationships between
‘game’ and ‘play’ are not as simple as Suits suggests. With complete understanding
of both of Suits’ definitions of ‘play’ and ‘game,’ one can rationally conclude that a
logical independence exists between the two.
Following the completed definitions of ‘play’ and ‘game,’ we can progress to
the ultimate aim of ‘sport.’ Play carries an indispensable role in the concept of
game; however, we must maintain a logical distinction to avoid conflation. This
helps to further clarify the interrelationship within the tricky triad. The final
component on the continuum as proposed by Meier, is ‘sport’, and by defining its
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essence we will finally clarify whether the tricky triad works together in a sort of
progression as a continuum as alleged by Meier.
Subsequent to Suits’ revolutionary definition of a game, he proposed that,
“Sports are essentially games” with four points of qualification.214 Suits criteria for a
game goes as follows; “Sport must contain elements of skill, the skills in question
must be of a physical nature, the sport must have a sufficient following, and have
sufficient degree of institutionalization.”215 Outside of these four additional
requirements Suits’ considered the internal construction of game and sport
essentially the same.216 However, he also posits at a later point in in time, that sport
is not a species within the genus game.217 Despite the inconsistency Suits adapts his
position to move away from viewing game and sport as identical because of critical
flaws involving the third and fourth point of qualification. If sport is required to be
institutionalized, the genesis of an activity cannot come to pass as sport, because not
everything can be institutionalized. Sport often is conjured up spontaneously;
therefore, at some point it passes a threshold to become institutionalized. Sport is
better understood along an organizational continuum from relative absence of such
aspects to that of extreme regulation.218 Second, the degree and duration of ‘the
following’ associated with the sport in question is a difficult benchmark to set with
any degree of accuracy.219 Using popularity in this manner to define athletic games
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from games, is quite arbitrary and unsatisfactory due to variability.220 It would be
quite arbitrary to mandate a particular temporal period, while considering an
eternity seems unreasonable due to the reliability of change with successive
generations. As a consequence of these errors Suits alters his understanding of the
tricky triad to evolve the definition of sport and play, while retaining his current
definition of game.221
After Suits renounces his original position (which in fact, is the one that
Meier ultimately embraces in the end) regarding the similarities of game and sport,
he uncovers a distinction between types of sport utilizing a Venn Diagram as will be
shown later in this section. According to Suits, sport is comprised of two different
types of competitive events: sports in the form of a refereed contest, and sports in
the form of a judged performance.222 One is a performance and so requires judges,
while the other exists as rule-governed interplay involving participants with rules
enforced by referees to fairly determine the winner.223 For example, consider
rhythmic gymnastics. Furthermore, differences exist in the types of rules regulating
judged versus refereed sports. In refereed sports, the artificial barriers are erected
just so they can be overcome by the use of rule-governed skills.224 Rules are the
crux of games because it is the rules of any particular game that generates the skills
appropriate to that game.225 Conversely, judged events don’t have constitutive
rules, but rather favor rules of skill. In the example of rhythmic gymnastics the rules
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guiding the competition are those of skill, which should be considered akin to a
method of best practice.
The definition of ‘sport’ is more complex than it was when it was first
envisioned. Refereed base sports are the same as a game, sharing some basic
characteristics, but judged performances possess others characteristics that are no
less different from the structure of ‘game’. Klaus Meier’s Triad Trickery: Playing
with Sport and Game serves as a rebuttal to Suits’ article Tricky Triad: Games, Play,
and Sport, supporting Suits’ original assertion that all sports are games with the
only qualification being a requirement of physical skill. He utilizes an Euler
Diagram, as will be shown later in this section. His support is linked with a revision
of an error Suits makes in relation to the idea of the rules governing judged
performances. Meier claims that Suits is wrong to suggest that judged performances
are not subject to rules like referee dependent sport (Meier, p. 20).226 Meier
recounts Suits’ parable of Ivan and Abdul’s no holds barred fight to the finish in The
Grasshopper.227 Ivan doesn’t immediately destroy Abdul upon consenting to fight,
which suggests adherence to a time restriction, which is tantamount to a rule. This
parallels with judged performances, and the previous example of rhythmic
gymnastics, where the competition is guided by a designated routine time limit,
change over, and order. However, I feel it is important to turn our attention to the
aim of the performance, and the possibility that Suits overlooks the importance of
regulative rules within performance sport. In the Elements of Sport Suits identifies
the three types of rules: constitutive, regulative, and skill. The rules combine to
226
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compose the conduct of what one should do in a game; however each one has a
distinct function. If some constitutive rules aren’t followed, they carry penalties,
which serve as our regulative rule. When reconsidering judged performance sports,
a player must not only adhere to rules of skill, but also regulative rules that are
imposed by the judges. Suits was certainly right about the scarcity of constitutive
rules in performance sport, as they seldom exist, but that doesn’t necessarily result
in the exclusion of the performance sport from the category of ‘game.’ Suits grossly
overlooked regulative rules because if a performer fails to perfectly demonstrate a
rule of skill, the duty of the judge is to charge the performer with a regulative
penalty, ultimately reducing their score. Therefore, it can be argued that judged
athletic performances are essentially the same as refereed sport because they both
contain the original criteria of the Elements of Game, simplifying the definition we
use to define sport. Therefore, all sports are games with the added qualification of a
physical skill can be summarized as, “Physical activity that is either essentially
judged or essentially officiated. Sports are performances that follow a script and are
judged. Sports are games that have a pre-lusory goal, follow rules, and are
officiated.”228
I have set out to reach satisfactory definitions for each of play, game, and
sport from the sport philosophy literature. If we are in agreement as to the nature
of definitions we now are equipped with the appropriate provisions to embark on
answering the question of interrelationship between Play-Sport-Game.
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5.6 Interrelationships of Tricky Triad
The definition of ‘game’ and ‘sport’ advanced by Suits suggests that the occurrence
of ‘play’ isn’t as straightforward as Huizinga and Caillois originally anticipated. The
game definition outlined by Suits, presents a distinction between ‘play’ and conduct
required to make a ‘game’ possible, as being quite different. One can play a sport by
simply by following the rules; however, those who ‘play’ sport create their own
meaning through an altered sense of participation. Based on the agreed definition
by Suits, namely, that all ‘sports’ are essentially a specific type of ‘game’ with the
addition of physical skill, sports are subject to the same to same problem as stated
above. The possibility arises that a participant can submit themselves to the rules
for the sake doing the activity for some end that lies external to the actual activity.
Players must exhibit autotelicity, similar to that of Johnny, in order for their
behavior to be truly considered as play; otherwise, it is for something else outside
the play world.
With clear and exact definitions of the components of the tricky triad we can
now begin to arrange the framework of their interrelationship. Previously I spoke
to the Play-Games-Sport continuum proposed by Meier, who initially suggested,
That considerable agreement within the literature supports the
concept of a continuum extending from play to games and further to
sports. The Play-Game-Sport continuum suggests, in general, that
play activities gradually evolve in game and/or sport with the
transition characterized by decreasing spontaneity and freedom in
the direction of progressive formalization and increasing regulation,
achievement orientation, habituation, and institutionalization.229
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The continuum model pays heed to the surface understanding of the tricky
triad; however the logic is fatally flawed. The model requires ‘play’ to be
progressively rooted out of ‘game’ to the point of elimination upon reaching ‘sport.’
While the earlier definition I described as partially correct, in considering ‘game’
and ‘sport’ synonymous, the relation with play torpedoes both models. The
suggestion that play is more accurately characterized as an attitude or stance
adopted toward any given activity, such that the presence of this stance renders the
endeavor one of play and the absence of this attitude disqualifies the activity as one
of play.230 In sum, game or sport need not be exclusively played, they still allow
attitudes that are not play to be exhibited within the confines of the game. To better
illustrate the relationship of the tricky triad Suits uses a Venn diagram to represent
the three distinct concepts and their relationships provided below.231
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Figure 2 Bernard Suits’ Venn Diagram of Tricky Triad.232

1. Primitive Play
2. Sophisticated Play
3. Professional Non-Athletic Games
4. Amateur Performances
232
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5. Amateur Sport
6. Professional Sport
7. Professional Athletic Performances

With respect to Suits’ Venn diagram, there are couple of points that I take issue
with; however, the choice of the Venn diagram provides the best method of
depicting the interrelationship of the tricky triad presented as equal and related
concepts over that of Meier’s initial continuum model. The three distinct circles
overlap one another to show areas of commonality between one, two, or all three
concepts. By assembling the Venn diagram in a manner that expresses relative
equality between the three entities, Suits is claiming here that some sports, namely,
entirely judged ones are not games. But, if as argued by Meier, and originally by
Suits, all sports are in fact games, area 4 and 7 on the diagram can’t logically exist if
we’ve determined sports exist within the category of games.233 However, the
strength of Suits’ Venn diagram proves the continuum concept to be less accurate.
Play either exists or doesn’t within games and sport; a dual nature to going about
the activity exists when considering Suits’ play definition requirement of
autotelicity. The possibility of simply engaging in sport or games for reasons
external to the sake of doing it simply for itself exists, and for this reason the
diagram is suitable for representing that relationship. Thus, the context plays a
greater role than the content of the activity when participating.234 Meier, using
Suits’ original definitions, eventually corrected the inaccuracies of the Venn diagram
233
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relationship offered by Suits, by revising the scope of sport and repositioning it
within games using the Euler Diagram below.235

Figure 3 Klaus Meier’s Euler Diagram of the Tricky Triad236

The Euler Diagram more accurately presents the precise relationship of
sports and games according to the accepted fact that all sports are indeed games
presented by Suits (original position). By incorporating the area representing sport
within the domain of play, the logical inconsistency of the position of (4) and (7)
within Figure 2. no longer present logical trouble when the “tricky triad” is modified
into the Euler Diagram.
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Contrary to the continuum model, Suits’ and Meier’s (later version)
illustrations successfully demonstrate the complexity of the interrelationship with
the tricky triad as outlined.237 ‘Play’ exists as the wild card in the framework, either
present or absent. In the continuum model, the idea of a range in play is challenged
by the nature of the more precise sport philosophy definitions of each concept as
demonstrated by the Venn and Euler Diagrams through plotting their
interrelationship. Meier’s diagram (based on Suits’ original definition) is most
accurate primarily because he eliminates sport as an individual entity distinct from
game. Meier depends on Suits’ game definition and uses it to illustrate the
interrelationship most comprehensively, whereas, Suits does not in his own Venn
diagram (of his latter definition). In sum, Meier’s diagram demonstrates that a game
is any activity involving a pre-lusory goal, lusory means, constitutive rules, and
lusory attitude. While sports are essentially games requiring physical skill, when
play represents the stance of intrinsic appreciation of an activity.238 Therefore, I
have used Suits definition of ‘game’ and ‘play’ to arrive at the conclusion that ‘sport’
can be considered as ‘play’ or non-‘play’ depending entirely upon the particular
attitude adopted by a participant. However, Suits’ latter definition of sport has been
rejected. Suits’ and Meier’s illustration of the interrelationship allows for a clearer
elucidation of the spirit of play, and has been accepted as a superior account over
that is provided by the play-game-sport continuum model in philosophy of sport.
Although, our understanding of the interrelationship within tricky triads has
improved, logical imperfections persist in our understanding. According to
237
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Schneider, both Suits and Meier commit a category mistake while defining the tricky
triad.239 Schneider outlines differences between attitude and activity, which carries
implications for play. “A category mistake assumes something belongs to one type,
or logical category, when really it belongs to another.”240 According to Schneider,
“Play is [similarly] a mode of performing action rather than a type of action.”241
Within the two previous definitions for the tricky triad, both Suits and Meier define
‘playing’ sport through two different methods that don’t correspond sensibly. Both
Suits and Meier define sport using the framework Suits constructed for game on a
conceptual level. They also agree that the particular participant’s attitudinal
approach is central to the play element as proven through the example of Johnny
and the mash potatoes. Such a way of assigning the play concept avoids the logical
impediments that confronted Huizinga and Caillois by using compensation
(Amateur versus Professional) as the deciding factor. However, “It is not monetary
rewards that make the difference but rather the change in attitude of the
participant.”242 By reframing the professional versus amateur designation to one
that describes the personal reasons for participation, we easily avoid conceptual
ruts that lie in waiting. As Suits outlined towards the end of Words on Play, the
amateur athlete, in strict terms, can pursue victory so compulsively that it
represents the entire undertaking, transforming something resembling play into
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something that is exclusively means-ended activity.243 Meier establishes that sports
and games exist independent of play, but play may deepen the significance of the
activity for the player.244 But as pointed out by Schneider, “From this account, we
can deduce that play has nothing to do with the structure of the activity and
everything to do with the attitude to the player. However, certain structures may
encourage some attitudes and discourage others; while logically distinct, the levels
may be casually interconnected.”245
Schneider points out that a conceptual problem exists when plotting play in
the relationship of game and sport using Venn and Euler diagrams. We attempt to
define what something is by comparing its qualities to the essence of the definition
we have set out. Most notably the definition of game allows us to identify particular
activities as being game; however, the criteria used for play is incompatible with the
diagram method. Where ‘game’ and ‘sport’ must have the four qualities that define
the game in addition to that of physical skill, play is circumscribed by the autotelic
attitude. The diagram is used to plot the category where a specific activity would fall
under, however play itself poses a problem. Schneider claims that, the question, “is
rugby ‘play’?” in fact does not make any sense because it is not defined by the same
set of criteria. The question can only be answered from the micro level of the
individual, that is to say, the question should be “is that rugby player “playing?”246 A
game or sport itself doesn’t embody play, people do; so the question in that context
is unanswerable. A logical independence exists again proving Meier’s earlier
243
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assertion correct with respect to the fact the sport and games need not necessarily
be ‘played.’247 One must simply submit to the inefficiency of the activity along with
adhering to the means and rules, to be able to participate in a game.
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Chapter 6: The Conclusion
6.1 Summary
Throughout the course of this paper I have attempted to lead the reader on a long
winding odyssey on how the uniquely human concept of sport generates added
significance that stems from the simple decision to ‘play.’ Sports are important
because they present a method of finding intrinsic meaning within our own
embodiment that otherwise is not always available to us through sensible meansended conduct. Sport presents a universal connection that most can relate to when
it is played sincerely. This is primarily due the shared collective experience of ‘play’
everyone has participated in at one time or another. Among those ‘playing’ for the
genuine love of the game, competition, or challenge there is a period that exists
where ordinary precepts pertaining to purposive and rational human action are
discarded for the seemingly nonsensical. All in favor of temporarily living within a
very specific moment with behavior that can be only described as curious, if
perceived by an ordinary outsider. All of one’s being is dedicated to something that
is meaningless from the perspective of practicality. The paradoxical behavior of
such people brings into question the critical element of play. What other
phenomenon could possibly explain such actions alien to sensible mature people
with the benefit of a means-ended outlook? The tragedy of our day is forming one’s
understanding of the world solely from a means-ended perspective and applying it
in cases where it is incompatible e.g. the absurdity of playing games. This is the
issue I raise regarding the numerous stakeholders within contemporary sport who
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can’t see beyond this viewpoint to recognize the importance of play, in and of itself,
within sport and the deep enduring intrinsic meaning associated with it.
Both Huizinga and Caillois firmly establish, through their respective theories,
that play is an important naturally occurring phenomenon for all sentient beings.
Their seminal works produce a definition for the concept of play where it was
previously studied in academic disciplines, which neglected its phenomenological
nature. Where Huizinga and Caillois succeed is from the point of isolating the
unique characteristics of play and inferring what it is that provides its importance.
Both authors use formal analysis to differentiate play from the other. Huizinga
demonstrates incredible breadth proving that elements of play can exist under
every rock in our social landscape.248 Huizinga’s purpose was to demonstrate how
the play element spawns culture. Therefore, his focus wasn’t to ‘narrow’ play to a
specific application, but to identify its constitution through cross application.
Identifying similarities allowed Huizinga to begin formulating his definition through
parallels between play concepts previously thought to be unrelated, for example
war and philosophy. Huizinga dedicates a chapter to exploring the characteristics of
play in each of these cultural forms often thought of as profoundly serious. By way
of Huizinga’s analysis, one can better realize that the conduct within the context of
war in the Middle Ages appears to be governed by the same play framework guiding
the philosophy first practiced in Hellenic times between the philosopher Socrates
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and sophist Protagoras.249 Huizinga‘s definition of play provides an exceptional
foundation to begin refining the significance of the play phenomenon.
Beginning in the wake of Huizinga, Caillois made his own contribution by
specifically identifying the types and ways our behavior exists as ‘play.’ The sense of
structure Caillois provides goes beyond the simple definitional characteristic of
identifying play. It provides the next step of classifying it according different
qualities, demonstrating that a variety of different kinds of conduct can be reduced
to a similar experience of play. While Caillois successfully proves the wide range
within the concept of play, it becomes clear that it can be commonly confused with
‘game’ as we witness in his chapter on classification. Often he switches back and
forth between the different concepts of play and games. Caillois’ theory also
contributes to the confusion of these two concepts, leading to a logical
interdependence, where no such connection necessarily exists. Play and game are
separate concepts; however play certainly adds to the meaning of a game for a
participant. The evidence of conflation allowed us to better understand the
metaphysics of sport, and what more precisely, we are truly doing when we engage
in it. Without this clarity, a nebulous relationship of the concepts of sport, game, and
play prevails, preventing us from identifying what specific characteristics become
important within the practice. Therefore, each concept must be understood in and
of itself, and subsequent to this understanding, we can find meaning within the
practice.
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It has been my position in this study that the meaning inherent to this human
practice stems from the existential nature of play and sport. We have commonly
ascribed value from the standpoint of grouping it under the umbrella of play and the
unique characteristics that define the concept. This is a result of our overall
confusion and conflation of these concepts. Upon flushing out the important and
unique qualities of play we misunderstand the meaning of the concept through a
natural relation to work, and the distinguishing characteristics that separate it from
the ordinary means-ended activity. I assert that we must overhaul how we attach
meaning to our participation in sport. This is better understood through a clear
understanding of concepts critical to philosophy of sport and appreciation for the
process, and not solely the output. This speaks to the inherent value we have in our
lives that derives from intrinsic choice. The practice of sport is absurd, but when
reveling in the absurd in such an intelligent way with rules, prescriptions, and
proscriptions, a sense of human consciousness remains within the activity. By
managing to understand that the activity is utterly meaningless from the standpoint
of the ordinary, while recognizing the importance of adhering to rules of the activity,
a unique opportunity presents itself to find meaning through existence, selfdetermination, and embodiment in a deeply personal way.
Engagement of play and sport can provide us with obvious inherent meaning.
Through a contrast with the absurd hero Sisyphus, we can better understand that
despite the obstacle or task, intrinsic meaning presents itself in our endeavors. The
difference is the added significance of the intrinsic meaning of play. The player
simply experiences a heightened intrinsic meaning because of the unique personal
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characteristic of the play concept that I acknowledged through the writings of
Huizinga and Caillois.
By recognizing the deeply subjective world of the player with objective
understanding that tempers the immediacy of their play, its importance becomes
critical. Nagel’s concept of the view from nowhere, cited by Feezell, is critical to
maintaining the partition between two different very real worlds of the player.
Without playful irony, the absurdity of the play sphere would collapse and what was
once a unique space becomes no different from the ordinary.
From here we are better able to reevaluate the tricky triad and its
interrelationships. The philosopher Suits, provides his own changes to the concept
of play, but his greatest contribution, in my opinion in this regard, is his masterful
definition of a game’s constitution. From here it can be realized that sport and
games are very similar, outside of a principal feature of physical prowess. The sport
philosopher Meier demonstrates that Suits was right the first time with his
definition of sport. And the sport philosopher, Schneider, demonstrates that both
Suits and Meier commit a category mistake by trying to put the concept of ‘play’ into
Venn and Euler Diagrams with sport and game. However, through Suits’ definition
of sport it becomes clear that attitude plays a larger role in defining what we do,
than the absurdity of our actions. One can fully comply with the structure of
participating in games without truly playing them. Obviously, they would have an
especially impoverished view of the practice, but, nonetheless, such actions remain
squarely within the realm of possibility. It is only through combining the play
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mentality with the action of sport that we can derive true meaning within the
practice.

6.2 Meaning of Play
The special meaning of play exists in the fact that we exercise choice and selfdetermination when determining how we will go about finding our true essence. It
means something that we are flawed, inconsistent, and possess an imperfect sense
of control over ourselves as we go through quotidian life. However, sport presents
an opportunity to close the gap between what the mind wants and what the body
can realize. Constantly, we can struggle to complete the most insignificant task but,
when it is accomplished, with this type synchronicity, there are few intrinsic feelings
that can surmount this experience. We better discover who we are as individuals,
our breaking points, and strength not ordinarily exhibited in other arenas. Who we
are as players provide a “touchstone,”250 as pointed out by Delattre, to measure the
quality of ourselves as we continue on each day because the player represents a
form of ourselves we don’t ordinarily realize. People aren’t perfect but within the
crucible that is sport you can better realize who your are and the mettle you consist
of.
Through the course of this thesis I have connected how the metaphysics of
sporting activity corresponds, to the meaning and influence of play. The ideals of
sport and the player connect with the existential and reveal that play is one of the
best ways of discovering intrinsic meaning within our lives.
250
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